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s.  10/72  ):- 3 Propo~al for a directive 
s.  10/72  .., - 5 The Council of the European Communities, 
Having regard to  the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
and in particular Article 54(3) (g) thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee; 
Whereas  the  coordination  provided  for  in  Article  54(3)  (g)  was  begun  by 
Directive No. 68/151/EEC of 9 March 19'68  governing the  disclosure,  validity 
of  obligations  entered  into  by  the  representative  organs  and  the  nullity  of 
societes anonymes,  soci~tes en commandite par actions and societes a  responsa-
bilite Iimitee*;  · 
Whereas  the  coordination  of  national  laws  relating  to  such  limited  liability 
companies was continued by Directive No .... of ...  1  on the annual accounts; 
Whereas further the  coordination of laws  relating to societes  anonymes'~ must 
be  given  priority  because  these  companies  much  more  than  others  carry  on 
cross-frontier activities; 
Whereas the laws  of the Member States  relating' to  the  formation  and capital 
of societes  anonymes'~ were coordinated by Directive No ....  of ...  2  and those 
relating to  mergers  of such  companies were coordinated by  Directive No .... 
of ...  3;  · 
Whereas so  that the protection afforded to the interests of members and others 
is _made  equivalent, the laws of the Member States relating to the structure of 
societes anonymes'' and to the powers and obligations of their organs l}lUSt  be 
coordinated; 
Whereas in the fields  aforesaid equivalent legal  conditions  must be  created  in 
the Community for societes  anonymes'~; 
Whereas so  far as  concerns the organization of the administration of. this  type 
of  company  two  different  sets  of  arrangements  at  present  obtain  in  the . 
Community; whereas one of these  provides  for  one admi9istrative organ only 
while the other provides for two, namely ?  management organ responsible for 
managing the business of the company and an organ responsible for controlling 
the management body; whereas in practice, even  under the arrangement which 
provides  for  only  one  administrative  organ,  a  de  facto  distinction  is  made 
between active members who manage the business of the company and passive 
*  Where  the French  terms  are  used  in  the recitals  of this  Proposal  they  are to  be  t~ken to 
include  a · reference  to  the  corresponding  types  of  company  existing  in  each  of  the  six 
Member States. 
1  OJ  C  7  of 28.1.1972. 
•  OJ C 48  of 24.4.1970. 
3  OJ C 89  of 14.7.1970. 
6  s.  10/72 members_ who  confine themselves  t<;>  supervisiOn;  whereas  in  order to  delimit 
clearly the responsibilities_of the persons who are charged respectively with one 
or other of these  duties  it  is  preferable  that there  be  separate  organs· whose 
responsibility it is  to carry them out; whereas further the tWo-tier system will 
facilitate  . the  formation  of  societes  anonymes~·  by  members  or  gro!!ps  of 
members from different Member States and, thereby,, interpenetration of under-
takings  within the 'Community;  whereas  to  this  end  the  introduction· of the 
two-tier  system  on  an  optional  basis  would  not  be  suffiCient  and  whereas 
that structure must be  made cqmpulsory for· all sociei:es  anonymes*; 
Whereas the  la~s of certain  Member States  provide. for  worker participation 
within  the  supe~visory body· but no  such  provision  exists  in  other  Mem]:,er 
States; whereas differences in the laws relating to this field  must be  eliminated 
not least because they constitute a barrier to the application of the Community 
rules which are necessary to facilitate transnational operations involving recon-
. struction and interpenetration of undertakings, in particular in so far as concerns· 
the giving of effect to  Article  220  of the Treaty which provides  inter  alia  for 
international  merger  and  transfer· of  the  seat;  whereas  in  order  to  make 
provision for worker participation in appointing and dismissing _members of the 
supervisory- organ  the  Directive  does  not  make  rules  uniform  for  all  the 
Member  States  but leaves  them  to·  choose  between  a  number  of  equivalent 
arrangements; 
·Whereas  the. members  of  the  management and  supervisory  organs  must  be 
made subject to special  rules  relating to civil  liability which provide for joint 
and  several  liability,  reverse  the  burden  of  proof  in  respect  of  liability  for 
wrongful  acts  and ensure  that  the  bringing  of  proceedings  on  behalf of the 
company  for  the  purpose  of  making  those  J?ersons  liable  is  not improperly 
prevented;  · 
Whereas  as  regards  the  preparation  and  holding  of  general  meetings,  the 
shareholders must be protected by· equivalent provisions  relating to,  the form, . 
content  and  per!~d of  notice,  the  right  to  attend  and  to  be  represented  at 
meetings, written or oral information, exercise of the right to vote, the majorities 
r'equired for the passing of resolutions and, finally, the right to bring proceedings 
in respect of void or voidable resolutions; 
Whereas  certain  rights .of shareholders  should  be  capable  of  being  exerCised 
by a  minority of them; 
Whereas in the interests of members and others the audit of the annual accounts 
should be carried out by e:Xp·erts  .whose  independence is  guaranteed by special 
provisions; 
* Where the French  terms .are  used  in  the  recitals  of this  Proposal  they  are to  be  taken  to 
include  a. reference  to  the  corresponding' types  of  company  existing  in  each  of  the  six 
Meinl;Jer  State's.  ·  ·  · 
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Scope  of application 
Article  1 
1.  The coordination measures prescribed by this Directive apply to the laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  of the Member States  relating 
to the following types of company: 
' 
in Germany; die Akti~ngesellschaft, 
in Belgium: de naamloze vennootschap__:la 'societe anonyme, 
in France: la societe anonyme, 
in Italy: la societa per azioni, 
in Luxembourg: la societe anonyme, 
in the Netherlands: de naamloze vennootschap. 
2.  It shall be permissible for the Member States not to apply the provisions · 
of this Directive-to cooperatives  whose legal  form  is  that of one of the. 
types of company in~icated in  the foregoing paragraph. 
CHAPTER  I 
Structure  of  the  Company 
Article  2 
1.- The  Member  States  shall  make  provision  so  that  the  structure of  the 
company  takes  the  form  provided  for  in  Chapters  II  and  III  of  this 
.  Directive,  the  company  thereby· having  not  less  than  three  separate 
organs: 
(a)  the management organ responsible  for  managing and representing 
the company; 
(b)  the  supervisory organ responsible for  controlling the  management 
organ; 
(c)  the general meeting of shareholders. 
2.  They shall, further, make provision for the annual accounts to be drawn 
· up and audited in manner provided in Chapter IV  of this Directive. 
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1. 
CHAPTER  II 
The Management  Organ  and. the  Supervisory  Organ 
.Article 3 
The members of the  ma~agement o;gan shall be appoin_ted  by the super-
visory  organ. 
. -
2.  Where the management organ has more than one member, the supervisory 
organ shall specify which m~mber  of the ma~agement organ is responsible 
for questions of personnel and worker relations. 
3.  The provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to  national Ia:ws 
under  which  the  ~ppointment  or  dismissal  of  any  memb~r of  the 
management organ cannot be effected  against the wishes of the majority 
of  the  members  of the  supervisory  organ  who  were  appointed  by  the 
workers or by their representatives. 
Article  4 
1.  The laws  of the  Member States  shall  make  provision  that, at any  rate 
for companies which employ five  hundred staff or more, the appointment 
of members of the supervisory organ shall be made in manner ·provided in 
2. 
paragraphs 2 or 3.  · 
Without  prejudice  to  the  provtswns  contained  in  the  following  sub-
paragraphs, the ·members of the supervisory organ shall be appointed by 
the general meeting. 
Not less than one third of the members of the  supervi~ory organ shall be 
appointed  by  the  workers  or  th~ir representatives  or upon proposal  by 
the workers or their ~epresentatives.  . 
The laws of the Member States may provide in relation t~ the appointment 
of members  of the  supervisory  board  that some of those  who  are  not 
appointed in  manner provided  in  the  preceding subparagraphs  may be. 
appointed otherwise than by the general meeting.  .  . 
3.  The members of the supervisory organ shall be appointed by  that organ. 
However, the general meeting or the  repr~sentatives of the workers may 
object to the appointment of a proposed candidate on the ground either 
that he lacks the ability to carry.out his duties or that if he were appointed 
there  would,  having regard  to  the interests· of the  company, the  share-
s.  10/72 ..  9 ]10lders or the workers, be imbalance in the composition of the supervisory 
organ.  In  such  cases  the  appointment  shall  not  be  made  unless  the 
objection  is  declared  unfounded by  an independent body existing under 
public  law.  · 
4.  As regards companies which employ a lesser number of workers than that 
fixed in pursuance of paragraph 1 the members of the supervisory organ 
shall be  appointed by the general meeting. 
5.  The members of the first management organ and of the first supervisory 
organ  may  be  appointed  in  the  statutes  or  in  the  instrument  of 
constitution. 
Article  5 
1.  Only natural persons may be appointed ·as  members of the  management 
organ. 
2.  Where the laws of the Member States provide that legal persons may be 
members  of  the  superv.isory  organ,  those  legal  persons  shall  designate 
a  permanent representative who. shall  be subject to the same conditions 
and obligations  as  if  he  were  personally  a  member  of  the  supervisory 
organ, but wit~out prejudice to the liability of the legal person which he 
represents. 
Article  6 
No person may  be  at the same time a  member of the  management organ and 
of the supervisory organ. 
Article  7 
The members of the  management organ and of the supervisory organ shall be 
appointed for a specified period not exceeding six years.  They shall be eligible 
for  reappointment. 
Art~cle 8 
The management brgan and  _the supervisory organ shall not fix the remuneration 
of their own members. 
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Article  9 
1.  The members o{the management organ shall not, without the authoriza-
tion of the  supervisory organ, carry on within  another undert.aking  any' 
activity,  whether  remunerated  or not,  for  their  own  account  or  for 
acwunt ·of  any  other person. 
2.  · The general  mee~ing shall  be  informed  each  year  of the  authorizations 
given. 
3.  · ·A  natural  persori  shall· not  be  a  member  of  the  supervisory  organ  of 
more than 10 companies. 
Article  10 
1.  Every agreement to  which the company is  party and in  which a member 
.of  the  management organ  or of the· supervisory  organ has  an  interest, 
even  if. only  indirect,  must  be  authorized  by  the  supervisory  organ  at 
least. 
2.  Where a member of the management organ or supervisory organ becomes 
;:tware  that such circumstances as  are described in  paragraph 1 obtain, he. 
shall inform those two organs thereof.  The interested member shall not 
take  part  either  in  the  discussion  or  decision  relating  to  the  relevant 
agreement within  the  management organ  or  the  discussion  or decision 
relating  to  the  giving  of the  authorization  required under paragraph  1 
within  the  supervisory  organ.-
3.  The general  meeting· shall  be  Informed  each  year of the  authorizations 
given under paragraph' 1. 
· 4. ·  Want of authorization  by  the  supervisory  organ  or  irregularity  in  the 
decision giving authorization shall not be adduced as against third parties 
. save  where  the  company proves  that_ th~  third  party was  aware  of the 
want of authorization  or of the  irregularity  in  the  decision,  or that in 
view· of the circumstances he could not ·have been unaware thereof. 
.,  Article  11 
) .  The ll)ailagement organ shall-not less  than every  three  months  send  to 
the  supe~visory organ a report on the  progress of the company's affairs. 
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·' 2.  The management organ shall  within  three  months following  the end of 
each financial  year  present  to  the  supervisory  organ  the  draft  annual 
accounts and draft annual report within the  meaning of Articles  2  and 
43  of Directive  No ...  ·.  of ... 
1
•  / 
3.  The supervisory  organ  may  at any  time  request  from  the  management 
organ  a  special  report  on  the  affairs  of  the  company  or  on  certain 
aspects  thereof. 
4.  The  supervisory  organ  or  one  third  of  the  members  thereof  shall  be 
entitled  to  obtain  from  the  management  organ  all  information  and 
relevant  documents  and  to undertake 'all  such investigations  as  may be 
necessary.  The  supervisory  organ  may  authorize  one  or  more  of  its 
members or one or more experts to exercise  these  powers. 
5.  Each  member of the supervisory  o.rgan  shall  be  entitled  to  examme  all 
reports,· documents and information supplied  by  the  management organ 
to  the supervisory organ. 
Article  12 
1.  The authorization of the supervisory organ shall be obtained for decisions 
'of the management organ relating to:  . 
(a)  the  closure  or transfer of the undertaking or of substantial  parts 
thereof; 
(b)  substantial  curtailment  or  extension  of  the  activities  of  the 
undertaking; 
(c)  substantial organizational changes within the undertaking; 
(d)  establishment of long-ferm cooperation with other undertakings or 
the  te,rmination  thereof. 
2.  The  law  or  the  statutes  may  provide  that  the  authorization  of  the 
supervisory  organ  must  be  obtained  also  for  the  effecting  of  other 
operations. 
3.  The provisions of Article-10(4) shall apply as  regards third parties. 
Article  13 
1.  .  The members of the  management organ may  be dismissed by the super-
visory  organ. 
'  OJ  C 7  of 28.1.1972. 
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the organs or persons who appointed them and under the same procedures. 
However, the 'members of the supervisory .organ who were appointed by 
it under Article  4(3)  may  be  dismissed  only  where proper grounds for 
dismissal  are  found  to  exist  by  judgment _of  the  court  in  proceedings 
brought  in  that  behalf  by  the  supervisory  organ,  the  general  meeting 
or the workers' representatives. 
Article  11 
1.  The laws o£ the Member States shall make spch provision relating to the 
civil  liability  of  the  members  of  the .  management  organ ·and  of  the 
supervisory organ as  to ensure that, at minimum, compensation ts  made 
for all  damage sustained by the  company as  a result· of breaches of law 
or of the statutes or of_ other wrongful  acts  committed  by the members 
of those organs in  carrying out their duties. 
2.  Each member of  the  organ  in  question  shall  be  jointly  and  severally 
liable without limit.  He may however  exonerate himself  from  liability 
if he  proves that no fault is  attributable to him personally. 
3.  The provisrons  of the preceding paragraphs shall  apply even  where the · 
powers vested in the organ have  been allocated among its  members. 
4.  The  authorization ·given  by  the  supervisory  organ  shall  not· have  the 
effect  of  exempting the  members  of  the  management  organ  from  civil 
liability.  ·  . 
5.  Furthermore,  any  discharge,  instruction  or  authorization  given  by  the 
general meeting shall not have the effect of exempting the .members of the . 
management organ or of the supervisory orga11  from civil liability. 
"'  Article  15 
1.  Proceedings on behalf of the company to -enforce the liability referred to 
in Article 14shall be commenced ibhe general meeting so  resolves. 
2.  Neither the law nor the statutes may require fo?the passing of a resolution 
in that behalf a majority greater than an absolute majority of votes of the 
shareholders present or represented. 
Article  16 
It shall be provided that proceedings on behalf of the COf!lpany  to enforce the 
liability referred to in Article 14 shall also be commenced if so requested by one 
or more shareholders:  · 
. (a)  who hold shares of a certain nominal value or proportional value which 
the Member States shall not require to be greater than 5  % of the capital 
subscribed;  or 
s.  10/72 (b)  who hold shares of a certain nominal value or proportional value which 
the  Member States shall not require to  be  greater than 100 000  units  of 
account.  This figure  may vary up ·to not more than 10  %  for purposes 
of c.onversion into national currency.  -
Article  17 
The bringing of proceedings on  behalf of the company to enforce the liability 
referred to in Article 14 shall not be  made subject, whether by ·law, the statutes 
or any agreement: 
(a)  to prior resolution of the general meeting or other organ of the company; 
or 
(b)  to prior decision of the Court in respect of wrongful acts of. the members 
of the  management organ or of  the  supervisory  organ~ or in  respect  of 
the dismissal or replacement of members thereof. 
Article  18 
1.  Renunciation by the comp·any of the right to bring proceedings on behalf 
of the company to enforce the liability referred to in  Article 14 shall  not 
_be  implied: 
(a)  from  the  sole  fact  that  the  general  meeting  has  approved  the 
accounts relating to  the financial year during which the acts giving 
rise to damage occurred; 
(b)  from the sole fact that, the general  meeting has  given  discharge to 
the members of the management organ or of the supervisory organ 
in  respect of that financial  year.  · 
2.  For renunciation  to  take  place the  following  minimum  conditions must 
be  satisfied: 
(a)  an act giving rise to damage must actually have occurred; 
(b)  the general meeting must expressly resolve to renounce; the resolu-
·tion shall in no way affect the right conferred by Article 16 on one 
or more shareholders who  s~tisfy the requirements of that Article, 
provided  they  voted  against  the  resolution  or  made  objection  . 
thereto which was recorded in  the minutes. 
3.  This  Article  shall  apply  to  all  compromises  relating to  the  bringing of 
proceedings  to  enforce  the  liability  aforesaid  .which  have  been  agreed 
between the company and the member whose liability is in question. 
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· 1. ·  Proceedings  on  behalf  of the  company  to enforce  the  liability  referred 
to in Article· 14 may also_ be brought by a creditor of the company who 
· is  u~able to  obtain payment from  it.  ·  · 
2.  Action  by  the  creditor under the  preceding paragraph shall  i:n  no  way 
be .affected  by  su.ch  renunciation  or  transactions  as  are  referred  to  in 
Article  18. 
Article  20 
1.  The  Member  States  "shall  make  such  proVISIOn  relating  to  the  civil 
liability of the members of the management organ and of the supervisory 
organ as  to ensure that compensation is  made for all  damage sustained 
personally by shareholders  and  third  parties  as  a  result of breaches  of 
law or of the statutes or of other wrongful acts committed by the members 
of those organs iri  carrying out their duties.  . 
2.  The provisions of Article 14(2) to (5)  shall apply: 
Article 21 
The period in  which  action to enforce  the liability  referred  to in  Article  14, 
19  or 20 may  be  brought shall not be less  than three years  from the date of 
the act giving rise to damage or, if the act has been dissembled, from the time 
when it has become known.  · 
CHAPTER III 
General meeting 
Article  22 
1.  The general meeting shall be convened at least once each year. 
2.  It may be convened at any time by the management organ. 
ArtiCle  23 
1.  It  shall· be  provided  that· one  or  more  shareholders  who  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  Article  16  may  request  the  company  to  convene  the 
general meeting and settle the agenda: therefor. 
s.  10/72  15 2.  If, following a request made under paragraph 1 no action has been taken 
by the company within one· month, the competent court must have power 
to convene the general meeting or to authorize it to be convened either by 
the shareholders who requested that it be convened or by their  agents.~ 
Article  24 
L  The laws  of the  Member States  may  provide  that the  general  meeting 
of  a  company  all  of whose  shares  are  registered  may  be  convened  by 
notice sent by registered letter.  In every other case the meeting shall be 
convened by notice  published at least in  the  company's national gazette 
designated  in  that  behalf  pursuant  to  Article  3(4)  of  Directive 
No. 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968. 
2.  The  notice  shall  contain  the  following  particulars  at least: 
(a)  the name of the company and the address of its registered office; 
(b)  the place and date of the mee!ing; 
(c)'.  the type of general meeting (ordinary, extraordinary or special); 
(d)  a statement of the formalities, if any, prescribed by the statutes for 
attendance at the general  meeting and for the exercise of the right 
to  vote; 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
any provisions of the statutes which require the shareholder, where 
he  appoints an agent, to appoint a person who falls  within certain 
specified categories of persons; 
the  agenda; 
the wording of proposed resolutions  concerning each of 'the  items 
on .  the  agenda.  . 
3.  The length of the period between the date of dispatch by registered letter 
of  the  first  notice  of  meeting  and the  date  of the  first  meeting  of the 
general meeting shall  be  not less  than two  weeks,  and the length of the 
period between the date of first publication of the notice of meeting and 
the date of the first meeting of the general meeting shall be not less  than_ 
one  month. 
Article 25 
1.  It shall  be  provided  that  one  or  more  shareholders  who  satisfy  the 
requirements  of Article  16  may  request that one or more  new  items  be 
included in  the agenda of a general meeting of which notice has already 
been  given. 
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company  within five  day!)  following  the  date  of  dispatch  by registered 
letter of the first notice of general  meeting or within 10  days  following 
the first publication of the notice of general meeting. 
3.  The items  whose inclusion  in  the agenda  has-.been  requested under the . 
last foregoing paragraph shall be communicated or  ·published in the same 
way  as  the  notice  of  meeting,  not  less  than·  five  days  or  10  days, 
·respectively, before the meeting. 
Article ·26 
Every shareholder who has completed the formalities  pr~scribed by law or by  . 
the statutes shall be  enti~led to attend ,the general meeting. 
Article 27 
1.  Every shareholder shall be  ~ntitled to  appoint a person to represent him 
at the general meeting. 
2.  The  statutes  may  restrict  the. choice  of  representative  to  one or more 
specified categories of persons.  Every  shareholder must,  however, have 
the right to appoint another shareholder to :represent him. 
3.  The appointment shall  be  made  in  writing which  shall. be  sent to  the 
con:tpany and be retained by it for not less  than three years. 
Article 28 
1.  If any person publicly invites  shareholders to send their forms of· proxy 
to him and offers to appoint agents for them, Article 27 and the following 
provisions  shall  apply: .  · 
(a)  the appointment shall relate only to one meeting; it shall, however, 
be valid for a second meeting having the. same agenda; 
.(b)  the appointment  shall be revocable; 
(c)  . ·the invitation shall  be sent in writing to  every  shareholder whose 
name and permanent ~ddress are known; 
(d)  the invitation shall contain the following  p~rticulars at least: 
(aa)  the agenda of the meeting; 
(bb)  the wording of proposed resolutions  concerning each of the 
items on the agenda;  · 
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(f) 
(cc)  a  statement to  the  effect  that the  documents  referred  to  in 
Article 30 are available to. any shareholder who requests_ them; 
(dd)  ·a request for instructions concerning the exercise of the right 
to vote in respect of each irem on 'the agenda; 
(ee)'  a  statement of the way in  which the agent will  exercise the 
right to vote if the shareholder gives  no instructions;  · 
the rightto vote shall be exercised in accordance with the instruc-
tions of the shareholder or, if none are given by him, in accordance 
with the statement made to  the shareholder; 
the agent may, however, depart from the instructions given by the 
shareholder. or from  the  statement made  to  him  if  circumstances 
arise  which  were  not  known  at  the  time  the  instructions. or 
invitation·  wer~ sent and the interests of the shareholder might be 
detrimentally affected;  -
.  . 
(g)  · where the right to vote has been exercised in a manner contrary to 
the shareholder's instructions or to the statement made to him, the 
agent shall forthwith inform the shareholder and explain the reasons 
therefor. 
2.  Tbe provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall apply where the c9mpany 
invites  the shareholder to send  his  form  of proxy to it and it appoints 
m~~~  .  . 
Article  29 
A list of persons present shall be drawn up in respect of .each general meeting 
before any business is transacted.  The list shall contain the following particulars 
at least:  .  · 
(a)  .  the name  and permanent address  of  each  shareholder present; 
(b)  the name and permanent address of each shareholder represented and of 
. the person representing him; 
(c)  ·.  the  m~mber, class,  nominal  or proportional value and number of votes 
attaching to  the shares of each shareholder present _or  represented. 
Article 30 
1.  The  documents  relating  to  the  annual  accounts  within  the  meaning of 
Article 2(1)  of Directive No .... of ... 
1  together with the report of the 
persons responsible for auditing the  accou~ts (Article 60 of this Directive) 
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18  s.  10/72 ~hall be  available to every  shareholde~ at latest from  the date of dispatch 
or of publication of the notice of general  meeting  convened to examine 
or adopt the annual accounts and the appropriation of th'e  results of the 
financial year  . 
. 2.  Paragraph 1 shall apply also to contracts in respect of which the approval 
of the general meeting is required. · 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Article 31 
:Every shareholder wh~  so  requests  at a  general meeting. shan be entided 
to obtain correct information  concerning the  affairs  of  the COJ1lpany  if 
such  information  is  necessary. to  enable  an  objective  assessment  to be 
made of the items on the agenda.  . · 
The management organ shall supply the information. 
. ·The communication of information may be refused only where: 
(a)  communication might cause material detriment to the company, or 
. (b)  · the company is under legal obligation not to 4ivulge the information 
in question.  · 
Disputes as to whether a refusal to supply information was justified shall 
be determined by the court: 
. Article 32  .· 
1.  The general meeting shall not pass any resolution concerning items which 
do not appear on the agenda.  ' 
.  2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply provided all the shareholders are present or 
are represented  at the general  meeting  and no shareholder requires  his -
objection· that the  business  in .  question  should· not be  discussed  to  he 
recorded in the minutes. 
3.  It  shall,  however,  be  permissible  for  the  Member  States  not to  apply 
·, paragrapn 1 to  resolutio·n~ relating to the following matters: 
(a)  dismissa]  of  me111bers  of  the  management  organ  or  superviso_ry 
organ  or  of  the  persons  responsible  for  auditing  the  accounts; 
provided  that at .the  same  meeting  of the  general  meeting· other 
persons are appointed to  replace them; 
s  .. 10/72  -19 (b)  the  bringing of proceedings  on  behalf of the company to  enforce 
the  liability  of  the  members  of the  management organ  or of the 
supervisory  organ,  provided  that the  annual  accbunts  have  been 
discussed or been the subject of a resolution at the same f!l·eetirig;  .-
(c)  the calling of a new meeting. 
Article  33 
1.  The shareholder's right to vote shall  be proportionate to the fraction of 
capital subscribed which the share represents. 
2.  Notwithstanding· paragraph  1,  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  may 
authorize the statutes to allow: 
(a)  restriction  or exclusion  of the  right  to  vote  in  respect  of shares 
which carry special advantages; 
(b)  _  restriction of votes in respect of shares allotted to the same_ share-
holder, provided the restriction  applies  at least to all  shareholders 
of the same class. 
3.  In no. case may the right to vote be  exercised where payment up of calls 
made by the ~ompany has not been effected. ·  -
Article 34 
Neither  a  shareholder nor  his  representative  shall  exercise  the  right  to  vote 
. attached to· his shares or to shares belonging to third persons where the subject 
matter of the resolution relates to:  -
(a)  discharge of that shareholder; 
(b)  . rights which the company may exercise against that shareholder; 
(c)  the release of that shareholder. from his obligations to the company; 
(d)  approval of contracts inade between the company and that shareholder. 
Article  35  · 
Agreements wherehy a shareholder undertakes to vote in  any of the following 
~ays shall be void:  '  ·  · 
(a)  that  he  will  always  follow  the instructions  of the  company or of one 
of its .9rgans; 
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(b)  ·  that he  will  always  approve proposals made by the company or by one 
of its organs; 
(c)  that he will  vote  in  a  specified  manner,  or abstain,  in  consideration  of 
special  a~vantages. 
Articie 36 
1. .  Resolutions of the general meeting shall  be  passed  by  absolute majority 
of  votes  cast  by  all  the  shareholders  present  or. represented,  unless  a 
greater majority  or other requirements  b~ prescribed  by  law or by  the 
statutes .. 
2.  The foregoing paragraph shall not apply to  the  appoint~ent of members 
of the management. organ or of the supervisory organ or of the persons 
responsible for auditing the accounts of the company.  · 
Article  37 
1.  A resolution of the general  meeting shall  be  required .for any  alteration 
of the  statutes.  · 
2.  ·  The laws of the  Me~ber  State~ may,· however, provide that the general 
meeting may authorize another organ of the company to alter the statutes, 
·provided: 
(a)  the  alteration  is  effected  only  for· the  purpose  of  giving·  effect 
to a resolution already passed by the general meeting; or 
· (b)  the  alteration  is  imposed  by  an  administrative· authority  whoi'\e 
approval is  ne~essary in  order for alterations of the statutes to be. 
valid;  ·  ·  · 
(c)  the  alteration  is  effected  solely  in  order  that the statutes  comply 
with compulsory provisions of law. 
Article  38. 
·The complete  text of the alteration  to the statutes which is  to· be put before 
the general meeting shall be set out in the notice :of meeting. 
Article 39 
l.  ·A majority of not less  than two thirds either of :Votes  carried by shares 
represented at the meeting or of the capital SUQscribed which is represented 
thereat -shall  be  required  for  the  passing  by  the  general  meeting  of 
resolutions  altering the statutes. 
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2:  Where, however, the laws of the Member States provide that the general 
meeting  p1ay  validly  ttan~act business  only  if  at least one  half  of the 
capital subscribed is  represented, resolutions for alteration of the statutes 
. shall require a majority not less than that required under Article 36. 
3.  Resolutions  of  the  general  meeting  which  wquld  have  the  effect  of 
increasing  the liabilities  of the  shareholders  shall require  in  any  event 
!he approval of all  shareholders involved. 
-Article. 40 
1.  A resolution of the general meeting shall, where the share capital is divided 
into different  classes  and  the  resolution  is  detrimental to  the holder o£ 
· shar~s of  thos~ classes,  be valid .  only  if  consented  to  by  separate  vote 
at least of each class.  . 
2.  Article 39 shall apply. 
Article  41 
1.  Minutes shall be prepared of every meeting of the general meeting. 
2.  The minutes shall coritain the following particulars at least: 
(a)  the place and date of the meeting; 
(b)  the resolutions passed; 
(c)  the result of the voting; 
(d)  objection.§  tr~ade by  shareholders  to  discussion  of particular items 
of business. 
3.  There shall be annexed to the P1inutes: 
(a)  the list of persons present; 
(b)  the do~uments relating to the calling of the general meeting. 
4.  The  minutes  and  the  documents  annexed  thereto  shall  be  held  at the 
disposal  at least of the sh;:treholders  and shall  be  kept for not less  than 
'three  years.  · 
·  Article  42. 
The Member States shall  ensure  th~t,'· without prejudice  to rights  acquired in 
good faith. by third parties,  all  resolutions  of the general  meeting are void or 
voidable  where:  · 
(a)  the  general  meeting  was  not called  in  conformity  with  Article  24(1), 
(2){b)  and  (d)  and (3); 
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(c) 
. (d) 
(e) 
(f) 
the subject matter of the resolution ~as not communicated and published 
in  conformity with Article 24(2)(f) or Article  2~(3), but without prejud_ice 
to the provisions  of Article .32(21 or (3);  .  -
contrary  to  Article. 26,  a  shareholder  was  not allowed  to  attend the 
general  meeting;  · 
contrary to Article 30, a-shareholder was  unable to examine a document . 
or, contrary to  Article 31, information was refused to him; 
. in the .course of tra11sacting busine_ss  the provisions of· Articles 33  and 34 
.relating to 'the exercise  of th~ right of vote were not observed  and· as .a 
·  ·result thereof the  outcom~ of the vote was decisiv~ly affected;  · ··  .. ; · 
the majority required under Article 36 or 39  was not obtained. 
Article ·43 
~Proceedings under Article 42 for nullity or voidability ~ay be  br~ught at_ least: 
(a) 
(b) 
·(c) 
in  the case  of Article 42(a),  by  any  shareholder who was not present or 
represented at the general  meeting;  '  . 
in  the case of Article 42(b), by  any shareholder .unless he  was present or 
represented at the general meeting but did not cause to be recorded in the 
minutes  his  objection  that the  bqsiness  in  _question  should  _not  be 
discussed;  ·"· 
in the case of Article 42(c),  ~y any~ shareholder who was  not allowed to  · 
attend the general meeting;  · 
(d)·  ·in  the- case  of Article  42(d),  by  any.  shareholder  who  was· unable  to 
(e) 
(f) 
examine any document or to whom information was refused; 
in. the  ~ase ofArticl~--42(e), by anysharehold~r.who was excluded from 
·voting or who·  disput~s the right to  v,ote  of some other shareholder who 
ro~;  .  -
in the case of Article 4.2(f), by any shareholder. 
·.·Article 44 
Proc~edings· for nullity or voidability shall be brought within. a period which the 
Member States shall fix  at not less  than three months rior more than one year 
from the time when the resolution of the general meeting could be ·<\ddQced  as 
against the person who claims  that the resolution is  void  or voidable: 
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A Resolution of the general meeting shall not be declared void where .it has been 
replaced  by  another  resolution ·passed  in  conformicy  with  the  law  or  the 
statutes:  The competent court must have power to allow the company time to 
·do  this. 
Article 46 
The question  whether a  decision  of nullity  pronounced by  a  court of law in 
respect of a resolution of the general meeting may be relied on as against third' 
parties  shall  be  governed  by  Article. 12(1)  of Directive  No.  68/151/EEC  of 
9  March  1968.  . .  · 
Article  47 
Where the laws of the Member States provide for special  meetings  of holders 
of certain  classes  of shares,  the  provisions  of Chapter 3  shall  apply  to  such 
meetings and to the resolutions thereof. 
CHAPTER IV 
The  adoption 'and  au.dit  of the  annual  accounts 
Article 48 
1.  The  annual  accounts  within  the  meaning  .of  Article  2  of  Directive 
No .... of ...  1  shall be adopted by the general meeting. 
2.  The laws  of the Member States  may,  however, provide that the annual 
accounts shall be adopted not by the general meeting but by the manage-
ment organ  and .the  supervisory  organ,  unless  those nyo organs  decide 
. otherwise or fail to agree. 
.Article 49 
1.  Five per cent of the result for  each year,  reduced where appropriate by 
losses  brought  forward  from  previous  years,· shall  be  appropriated  to 
legal  reserve  until  that  reserve  amounts  to  not less  than 10  %  of the 
capital subscribed. 
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2.  So  long as  the legal· reserve  does not exceed the amount specified in the 
foregoing paragraph it shall not be used except to set off losses and then· 
only if  other reserves are inadequate for that purpose, 
·Article 50 
1.  . The general  meeting shall decide  how the result for each year,  reduced 
where  appropriate  by  the· amount of the  losses  brought forward  from 
previous years, are to be appropriated. 
2.  The statutes may, however, ·provide for the appropriation of a maximum 
· of .SO  %  of the result referred to in paragraph l. 
Article  51 
1.  'one or niore persons shall be  rriade  responsible for auditing the accounts 
of the  company. 
2.  The ·audit  shall  in·  any  event  cover  the  annual  accounts  within  the 
meaning of Article 2 of Council Directive No .... of .. }  and the annual 
report within the meaning of Article 43  of tha_t  Directive. 
Ariicle 52. 
_  Only persons who are independent of the company and who·are nominated or 
approved  by  a' judicial  or administrative  a4-thority may be  charged  with  the 
responsibility of auditing the accounts of the company. 
ArtiCle  53  \ 
. 1.  The· audit  ot"  the  accounts  shall  in  no  case  be  undertaken  by  persons 
who are members, or who during the last three years have been members, 
of  the  management  organ,  s.upervisory  organ  or staff of the  company 
whose accounts are to be audited. 
2.  Further, .the  audit  of  the  accounts  shall in  no- case  be undertaken_ by 
companies or firms whose member.s or partners, members of the manage-
ment  organ  or  supervisory. organ,  or  of  which  the  persons  who  have 
power  of  representation  are .  members,  or  during  the  last  three  years 
have been m'embers, of the management organ, supervisory organ or staff 
of the company whose accounts are to  be audited .. 
_; 
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1.  The persons who have  audited the  accounts  shal_l ·in  no  case  be  or,  for 
a  period  of  three  years  following  cessatio.n  of  their  duties,  become 
members  of  the management  organ,  superviso-ry  organ or staff  of the 
company whose accounts have been  audited. 
·  2.  Further, the ·members or partners, members of the management organ or 
supervisory  organ or the persons  who  have power of representation  of 
the  companies or firins  who have  audited the  accounts shall in  no case 
. : -become. members. of the  management organ,  supervisory. organ·. or staff 
of the company whose accounts. have been audited, less  than three years 
after cessation of their duties. 
Article  55 
1.  The persons  who  are to  audit the  accounts  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
general  meeting.  This· Directive  shall,  however,  be  without, prejudice 
to. the provisions of law of the Member States relating to the appointment 
of such persons at the time of formation of the company.  · 
2.  Where  appointment by  the general  meeting  has  not been  made  in  due 
time or where  any  of the  pe~sons appointed is  unable to  carry out his 
duties, the management organ, the supervisory organ or any shareholder 
must have the right to apply to the court for appointment of one or more 
. persons to audit the accounts. 
3.  Fi.rrther,  the  court must have power to  dismiss,  where  there  are proper 
grounds,  any  perSOJ;1  appointed  by  .the  general  meeting  to  audit  the 
accounts,  and  must also  have  po~er to  appoint some other person  for 
. that purpose if application is  made by the management organ, supervisory 
. .  organ  or by  one or more shareholders  who satisfy  the requirements  of 
. Article  16. 
Such  application  shall  be  made  within  two weeks  following  the  date  of the 
appo.intment by· the· general  meeting; 
Article  56 
The persons  who  audit the  accounts  shall  be  appointed  for  a period  certain 
of not less  than three years  nor more than six  years.  They- shall  be  eligibl_e 
for  reappointment. 
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Article  57  _ 
L  The remuneratio-n of  the  persons  appointed  by  the  general  meeting to 
audit the  accounts shall be fixed for  th~ whole  of their period· of office 
before it commences. ·  ·  .. 
2.  Apart from the remuneration fixed  pursuant _to  paragraph 1,  no remune-
ration or benefit shall be accorded  to  the· persons  in  question in respect 
of their auditing of the a~counts.  ·  · 
3.  The provisions  of_ paragraph 2  shall  apply  to· the ·persons  appoint~d by 
the Court to audit the accounts.  - ·  ·  ·  -· 
Article  58 
1.  The persons  appointed to audit the accounts  shall  in  all  cases  examine 
whether ·the annual accounts within the meaning <?f  Artide .2 of Directive 
No ....  ·of ... 
1  arid  the annual report.  within the· meaning of-Artide ·  43 
of that Directive are in conformity with the law ·and the statutes:  · 
••  •  +  •  •  • 
2.  If they have rio  reservation to make, the persons· responsible for the audit 
shall  so  certify  on  the annual  accounts;  otherwise  they  shall  issue  their 
certificate subject to reservations or shall refuse their certificate. 
Article  59. -
_  The persons  responsible· for  auditing  the- accounts-shall  be.  entitled to obtain 
from the company all information and relevant _documents  and to undertake all 
-such investigations as may be  necessary..  ·  ·  ' 
Article  60 
Jhe  p~rsons. responsible  for  auditing  the .  accounts  shall  preia_re · a  detailed 
report relating -to  the  results · of their  \Vork.  · The  rep(m s~all_ contain  t~e 
following at least:  . 
(a) 
(b) . 
ari  lndicati6t1  of  wh~thet  th~  provi~ions- of·Artid~ .51(1)  ha~e  been 
observedi ·  ··  ·  ·  ·· 
observations  concerning  any infringements .of  =Jaw  or of .  the  statutes 
which have been found in the company's accounts, in its annual accounts 
. or it!  t~e management report; 
1  OJC7 of 28.1.1972. 
s.  10/72  27 
J. (c) 
(d) 
observations concerning any facts noted ~hich constitUte a serious danger· 
to the financial  siwation of the company; 
the  complete  ~ext  of  the  certificate  given_  pursuant  to  A~ticle  58(2). 
Where  reservations  have  been  made  or where  the  certificate  has  been 
withheld, the reasons therefor shall be specified. 
Article  61 
Save  where ,proper  grounds  exist,  the  persons  responsible .for  auditing  the 
accounts shall not be dismissed by the general meeting before _the  end of their 
period of office. 
Article  62 
Articles ·14 to 21  of this Directive shall apply in  respect of the civil liability of 
the persons responsible for auditing the accounts, so  as to ensure that compeQ- · -
sation is  made for any damage sustained by  the company, any shareholder or 
. third party as a  result of wrongful acts  committed by  those persons  aforesaid . 
in carrying out their duties. 
Article  63 
1.  The Member States  ~hall ensure that without prejudice to rights acquired 
in  good  faith  by  third  parties,  all  resolutions  of  the  organ  whose 
responsibility  it  is  to  adopt  the  annual  accounts  are  void· or  voidable· 
where: 
(a) 
(b)· 
(c) 
(e) 
. 28 
the  annual  accounts  have  not  been· audited  in  conformity  with 
Article  S8(1);  . 
the certificate relating to the  annual accounts  has  been refused  in 
accordance with Article 58(2); 
the annual accounts have not been audited by a  person nominated 
or approved in manner required by Article 52;  · 
the  annual  accounts have  been  au4ited by  a  person  who,  under 
Article 53, should n.ot  have been  made responsible for the audit, 
or  who  has  been  dismissed  by  the · court  in  conformity  with 
Article  55(3)  or· by  the  general  meeting· in  conformity  with 
Article 6i; 
the annual accounts have been audited by a  person who; contrary 
to Article 55(1), was not appointed by the general meeting or who, 
contrary to Article 55(2) or (3), was not appointed by the court  . 
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shareholder. 
3.  Articles 44 to 46 shall apply  .. 
CHAPTER V/ 
General  provisions 
Article 64 
1.  ·  The Member States  shall  !;>ring  into  force  within  18 _months  following 
the  notification  of  this  Directive  all  such  amendments  to  their. laws, 
regulations  or administrative provisions  as  may  be necessary  to comply 
with the  provisions  of this  Directive  and· shall inform  the  Commis~i9n 
thereof. 
2.  The Member States  may provide that the amendments to thetr laws  as  . 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1  shall  not  apply  to  companies  already  in 
existence  at  the  time  of  entry  into  force  of  those  amendments  until 
eighteen months after that time. 
.. 
3.  The  Member  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission,  for  information, 
the  texts  of the draft laws  and  regulations,  together  with  the  grounds 
therefor, relating to the field  goverped by this Directive.  The texts shall 
be  communicated not later than six  months before the proposed date of , 
entry into force o(  the drafts.  . 
Article 65 
This Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. / 
.  ' 
Explanatory· memorandum 
s.  10/72  31 Introduction 
I.  Article 54(3)  (g)  of the Treaty provides for  coordinatio~ of the  safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members  and others, are required 
by Member States of companies or firms with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent.  Coordination began with Directive No 68/1511  of 9  March 1968. 
That  Directive  applies  to  societes  anonymes,  societes  en  commandite  par 
actions and societes a  responsabilite limitee.  As regards these types of company, 
approximation has  been  effected  of .the  safeguards  required  in  the following 
fields: 
1.  .  disclosure of important information  relating to the company; 
2.  validity  of  obligations  entered  into  by  the' representative  organs of the 
company; 
3.  nullity  of companies. 
On 16 November 1971 the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal for 
a'"Fourth Directive
2  having th$!  same scope of application as  the First Directive, 
on the presentation and content of the annual accounts and report, methods of 
valuation, and publication of those documents. 
Continuing  its  work  of  coordination  of  the  law  relating  to  companies  and 
firms,  the Commission has  turned its  attention to  sodetes  anonymes*.  This 
is  the most important tjpe of company from the economic point of·  view  and 
the most developed from the legal point of view.  The coordination effected in 
respect of it will" make it easier to  coordinate  at a ·later :stage  the safeguards 
required for  other types.  The Commission has  submitted to the Council the 
following  proposals  for  coordination  of  the  safeguards  required  of· societes 
anonymes*:  . 
9 March 1970, Proposal for a Second Directive concerning formation of 
societes  anonymes*  and the maintenance and alteration of their capital8; 
16  June  1970,  Proposal  f9r  a  Third  Directive  concerning  merger  of 
societes  anonymes
4
• 
This Proposal for  a  Fifth  Direc~ive will  effect coordination of the safeguard§ 
required  as  regards  the structure of societes  anonymes*  and the  powers  and 
obligations of their organs. 
•  Where the French terms are used in  this Explanatory Memorandum they are to be taken to 
include  a  reference  to  the  corresponding_ types  of  company  existing  in  each  of  the  six 
Member States. 
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general  meeting  of  shareholders,  whereas  the  two-tier  system  has !wo:  the 
management  organ,  which  is  responsible for managing  the  business  ot  the . 
company  and for  representing  it,  and  the  supervisory  organ  responsible  for 
controlling the management organ. 
At present,  certain  Member States  employ the classical  form  and  others  the 
two-tier system.  Some  Member States allow  companies to choose one or the 
other, but one of those Member States has made the two-tier system compulsory 
. for undertakings over a certain size.  .  . 
iri  practice,  however,  the difference  between the  two arrangements is  not so 
great as it would seem at first sight.  Thedivision of responsibilities as between 
·the person's who carry out management duties  and those who supervise  them, 
effectively  obtains  under  the  classical  arrangement  as  well,  ·for  some  of  the 
·:members  of. the ·adfriinistrative organ manage and represent the company while 
..  the others are responsible for supervising them.  · 
This  is  already reflected  to  some  extent' in  legislation;  in  particular  in  the 
provisions which  make  management  and representation the responsibility  of 
one or more  members .of  the  administrative  organ or, sometimes,  of one or 
rp.ore General Managers, or managers, appointed by that organ.  This does not, 
however,  alter  the  fact  that these  persons  are  members,  with  others,  of  the 
same organ of the company.  · 
To  group  together,  within· a  single  administrative  organ,  persons  who  are 
responsible for carrying out different functions no longer answers the needs of 
!Jlodern  managell'l:ent  of  undertakings.  To  protect  shareholders  and .  third 
parties  it is  essential  that the fields  of  responsibility  be  clearly  demarcated. 
This ·can be  achieved  only by vesting  the responsil;>ility  for  management  and 
SUperVISIOn  in  separate. organs.  It will,  moreover,  facilitate  formation  of 
societes anonymes* ·by members or groups of members from different Member 
States.  Generally it will be sufficient for  them  to· be. represented  within  the 
· supervisory  organ  so  as  not  to  ob.strlict  the  formation  of  a  homogeneous 
ptanagement organ. 
For tht! foregoing reasons the two-tier system is  gaining support.  To introduce 
it on  an optional basis  would not,. however,  be  enough because  the classica:I 
system  does . not  afford  e'quivalent  safeg}lards  to  shareholders  and  third 
parties.  The  Directive  provides  that  for 'all  soeietes  anortymes  within  the 
common market there be a uniform type of structure comprising, alongside the 
general nieeting of shareholders, a management organ responsible for managing 
and representing the company ·and a supervisory organ to control the manage-
ment. organ. 
•·  ·Where the French terms are used in this Explanatory Memorandum they  are to be taken to 
include. a  reference  to  the  corresponding  types  of  company  existing  in  each  of  the  six 
Member  States. 
S;  10/72- 33 · The two-tier system should apply to all undertakings, irrespective of size, whiCh 
_ are  incorporated in the  form  of  societes  anonymes.  That form  is .  intended 
principally for medium or large undertakings; smaller undertakings  can adopt 
the form  of the  societe a responsabilite  limitee*. 
This is why the relatively high figure of 25 000  units of account is  proposed as 
the minimum capital of the societe anonyme*  (see Article 6 of the Proposal for 
a Second Directive).  -
Furthermore, disclosure of the annual accounts is provided for, in full,  only as 
regards ·societes anonymes*  (see, Article 2(2)  (f)  of the First Directive)  whereas 
for societes a  responsabilite limitee'' the degree of disClosure required may vary 
according to  the size  of the undertaking (see  Article 50 of the Proposal for a 
Fourth Directive). 
The members of a societe anonyme\ unlike those of a societe a  responsabilite 
limitee*, are as a  rule less  closely connected with the company.  This may be· 
seen  from  the fact  that shares  can  be  freely  transferred,  and be quoted on a 
stock exchange, with the result that the shares of ·a  company are often widely 
held  by  i:he  public.  The tendency will  be even greater under the influence of 
provisions promoting the issue  of shares  to employees.  One of the principal 
characteristics of the societe  anonyme*  is  the fact that the members  are  as  a 
rule neither able nor willing to exercise any permanent control over the persons 
who are responsible for  managing its  business.  This  cannot be remedied  by 
giving greater power to the general  meeting or to minorities  nf shareholders. 
It is  for this  reason that a  separate  supervisory organ must be  introduced. 
Companies  which  have  hitherto  employed  the  classical  arrangement  will  be 
able to change over to the two-tier  syst~m without any great difficulty.  The 
"passive" members of the administrative organ can be  appointed to the super-
visory organ and the  "active"  members  can be  appointed to  ca):ry  out duties 
within the management organ. 
The Directive does  not prescribe that the management organ must have more 
than one member.  This is  not necessary in view  of the fact  that the super-
visory  function  is  transferred  to  a  separate  organ.  However, "in  companies 
which have 500 employees  or more, for  which the Directive requires that .the 
employees  be  represented  on the supervisory  organ, that organ must have at 
least three members. 
III.  Introduction of the two-tier system on a compulsory basis for all societes 
anonymes* will enable, and require, the laws of the_Member States relating to 
worker-participation in the administration of such companies to be coordinated. 
* Where the French terms are used in  this Explanatory Memorandum they are to be taken  t<? 
include  a  reference  to  the  corresponding  types  of  company  existing  in  each  of  the  six 
Member States. 
34  s.  10/72 Of course, the problem of worker-participation is  not confined solely to under-
takings incorporated in the form of the societe anonyme*.  Thus, for example, 
participation occurs  everywher~, in  undertakings  of every  legal  form, through · 
representatives  appointed  by  the  workers  ro·  represent  them· vis-a-vis  the 
management.  The  scope  and  content  of these  representatives'  powers  vary 
from Member State t9 Member State.  Only by provisions fat approximation 
of  law  which  relate  to  undertakings  of  all  types- can  the  differences  be 
eliminated.  ~ 
This  Directive,  however,  deals . only  with ·coordination  of  laws  relating  to 
societes  anonymes*.  Accordingly  the  rules  relating  to  worker~participation 
must be confined to those. which are of the essence in the context of the societe 
anonyme*.  In a number of Member States participation in  the administration 
of companies of this type occurs on the part of the::  workers in addition to their 
being represented vis-a-vis the management. 
In one Member State the workers in certain sectors of the economy are repre-
sented  on  the  management  organ  as  well.  Coordination  is  not  absolutely 
necessary as  regards this aspect of the matter but is  essential in relation to the 
composition of the  __ supervisory organ: 
The laws of some Member States make it compulsory for workers of all  com-
panies, or at any rate of those which exceed a certain size, to be represented on 
the supervisory organ.  Other Member States  have no  such provisions.  The 
Directive could not both impose the two-tier system  upon all  companies  and 
at the same time allgw the differences in th:e laws of the Member States relatirig 
to worker-participation in  the supervisory  organ to continue.  .. 
The lack of coordination in this field is obstructing the adoption of Community 
. rules  concerning  transmttional  reconstruction  and  interpenetration  of  under-
takings.  _  ~  _  -
Worker-participation  in  the ·composition.  of  the  supervisory  organ  is  made 
mandatory for  companies  above  a  certain  size.  The Directive fixes  the  limit 
at 500 workers.  Over and above. this figure  the workers' interests  cannot be 
protected satisfactorily by means of worker-representation vis-a"vis the manage-
ment.  The workers must be able to take part in appointing and dismissing the 
members of the supervisory organ which  controls the  manag~ment organ. 
There is the advantage,  in  restricting worker-participation to  the supervisory 
organ, that the workers cannot be held responsible for acts of the management. 
Furthermore, none of the members·is subject to the instructions of the workers. 
Every member carries out his  duties under his  own responsibility and comple-: 
tely  independently.  Each has the same powers and obligations as  the others. 
It would be  inconsistent to 'allow  the  workers' representatives  on the  super-
visory o_rgan to ha_ye no more than an advisory role.  · 
* ·Where the French terms-are used in this  Explanatory Memorandum they are to be taken to 
include  a  reference  to  the  corresponding  types  of  company  existing  in  each  of  the  six 
Member States. 
s. ·10/72  35 Finally,  the fact that the  workers  are  represented  on  the  supervisory  organ 
does  not prevent them from  being subject to the instructions  of ~ht! manage-
ment in  carrying  out their working duties. 
The  Commission does  not  consider  it reasonable  to  create  an  entirely  new 
scheme  of worker-representation  on the  supervisory  organ.  In  thi~ field,  in 
which ideas proliferate, it seems  much more advisable to the Commission riot 
to anticipate future developments but to build on provisions of law which now 
exist.  Accordingly  the Directive does  not lay  down uniform rules  but leaves 
the  Member  States  to  make  their  choice  from  the  arrangements  set  out in 
Article 4(2)  and (3)  which notwithstanding the differences between them ensure 
equivalent safeguards for the workers. 
Article  1 
As  indicated  in  the Introduction,  the Directive  applies  only  to  societes  ano-
nymes*  (paragraph 1).  Member States may, however, exempt from the Direc-
tive cooperatives whose legal form is that of a societe anonyme* .(paragraph 2). 
A like provision appears in Article 1(2)  of the Third Directive.· 
CHAPTER  I 
Structure  of  the  Company 
Article 2 
The general  meeting  is  the  shareholders'  organ  for  discussion  and decision-
making.  More detailed rules on this subject are to be found in Chapter III of 
this Directive.  However, a  resolution of the general meeting is  only required 
for a small number of matters of great importance for the company.  In no case 
is  the general meeting responsible for the management or representation of the 
company,  or for  the permanent  supervision  of  its  activities,  this  task  being 
entrusted to otheJ; organs. 
- As  has already been indicated in the Introduction, every societe anonyme must 
have a management organ to manage and represent it and a supervisory organ 
to contrOl the management organ.  The provisions relating to membership of 
these organs are to be found  in  Chapter II  of this  Directive~ 
*  Where the French terms are used in  this Explanatory Memorandum they are to be. taken to 
include  a  reference  to  the  corresponding  types  of  company  existing  in  each  of  the  six 
Member States. 
36  s;  101n The next chapter, on provisions relating to the general meeting, is  followed by 
Chapter IV  which  contains  provisions  relating  to  the  adoption -and  audit of 
annual  accounts.  The -latter  contains,  in  particular,  rules  concerning  the 
persons responsible for  auditing the accounts.  Member States are  not obliged 
to give such persons the status of an organ of the company; this is  only oblig-
atory  as  regards ·the  general  meeting,  and  the  management  and  supervisory 
organs. 
Article  3 
It is a feature of the two-tier system that the ~ember  or members of the manage-
ment organ should always be appointed by the supervisory organ (paragraph 1). 
The supervisory body w!th its generally speaking smaller membership, is  better 
suited than the general meeting of all the shareholders to choose the persons to 
whoni  the  management  and  representation  of  the  undertaking  are  to  be 
entrusted. 
Where the management organ has more than ·one member, the workers in  the 
company will  want particularly  to  know which  member  of the  management 
organ is  responsible for questions of personnel and worker relations.  For this 
- reason such member should be expressly  designated;  this  should not however 
prevent his being entrusted with other tasks as· well  (paragraph 2). 
In one Member State, in certain sectors of the economy, there are special pro-
visions whereby no m.ember can be appointed to the management organ against _ 
the wishes of the majority of the members of the supervisory organ appointed 
by the workers.  The Directive is  without prejudice to such provisions.  _-
Article  4 
The Directive starts with the basic principle that the appointment of the super-
visory organ must be sanctioned by the general meeting.  Indeed, in companies 
~here  -the  workers take-no part in  appointing the members of the supervisory 
organ,  the general  meeting  has  exclusive  competence to  make  such  appoint-
ments  (paragraph 4).  It is  only  compulsory for the workers  to take part in 
such  appointments in  the case of companies employing five  hundred workers 
or more  (paragraph  1).  No  other  criterion,  such  as  the  amount of  capital 
subscribed,  or relationships  between shareholders  (family companies)  is  to be-
used.  The number of- workers indicated represents a minimum provision only. 
Member  States  may  therefore, .  when  organizing  worker  participation  in the 
appointment of the supervisory  organ pursuant to this  Din:ctive, fix  a  lower 
limit.  ' 
The forms taken by such participation need not necessarily be identic;al through-
out the Community.  The Member-States may be  left to chOose  froin  among 
several  examples which are considered- as  equivalent. 
S.'-i6!7i'  37 In the first example (paragraph 2)  some members of the supervisory organ are 
appointed by the generai meeting (first subparagraph) and some are appointed 
by  the  workers.  Not less  than  one-third·· of the members of the  supervisory 
organ must be workers' representatives.  The Member States have more or less 
. a free hand to organize the various details of procedure.  The power of appoint-
ment may be vested  either in  the workers directly  or in their representatives, 
for  example,  their representatives within the undertaking or the trade .unions 
represented in the undertaking.  It is  possible also to provide that the appoint-
ments should be made by  another organ of the company, such as  the general 
meeting, but only on proposal by  the workers or their representatives  (second  -
subparagraph). 
Finally, the laws of the Member States may provide for certain members of the 
supervisory organ to  be· appointed neither by  the general  meeting nor by the 
workers.  Representatives of the general interest come to mind here particularly. 
It will be for the Member States to regulate the making of such appointments. 
Members  so  appointed  need  not  necessarily  be  equal  in  number  to  those 
appointed by the shareholders or the workers  (third subparagraph). 
In  the  second example  (paragraph 3)  the  supervisory  organ  co-opts  its  own 
members.  However, the shareholders and the workers are involved by virtue 
of the fact that either the general meeting or the workers' representatives·may 
object  to  the  appointment  of  any  proposed  candidate.  This  right to object 
must not be used to block all  and any nominations.  For this re.ason  the only 
valid reasons for an objection are lack of ability on the part of the candidate · 
to carry out his duties or the fact that the appointment of the candidate would 
bring about an imbalance in the composition of the supervisory organ, having 
regard  to  the  interests  of the  company,  the  shareholders  and  the  workers. 
Furthermore,  the  final  decision  on  the  validity  of  the  objection  must  be 
entrusted to an independent body existing under public law.  The Commission 
is  working on the assumption that due regard will  be had for balanced repre-
sentation of the two sides of indust~y in the composition of supervisory organs. 
In  accordance with a  principle common to  all  legal  systems,  the members of 
the first management and supervisory organs may be appointed in the statutes 
or instruments of constitution. 
- Article· 5 
It follows from the nature of the management organ's responsibilities that only 
.. natural persons can be  appointed members thereof. 
A  different solution  is  adopted  in ·respect of· the  members  of the  supervisory 
organ.  The nature of their responsibilities  is  such that' it is  not necessary for 
them  to  be  limited  to  natural  persons.  However,  the  appointment  of legal 
persons  as  members  of the supervisory organ should  only be  allowed  by the 
Member States if certain measures are taken to avoid abuses: 
The leg;1l  person  may  only  be  represented  in  the supervisory organ by 
a perrn;tpent representative designated by  it._ 
·s.  101n -
This representative must satisfy all  the conditions prescribed by law and 
by  the  statutes  for  membership  of  the supervisory  organ.  Thus,  for 
example,  the disclosure  requirements  as  to the  identity of the members 
of  the  supervisory  organ  cover  also  the  identity  of  the  representative 
(Article  2  of  Directive  No.  68/151  of  .9  March  1968).  Thus,  also, 
Articles 6  and 54 of this  Directive,  which exclude  certain  persons from 
appointment as  members  of the  supervisory  organ,. apply where  appro-
priate to the representatives of legal persons.  ·-
The  representative  must  be  subject  to  the  same  obligations  as  if  he  were 
personally  a  member  o.f  the  supervisory· organ.  This  does  not  affect  the-
application  of any  provisions  in  Member States  whereby  the legal  person  is 
also  liable  for  the  acts  Of  its  representative.  On  the  other 'hand,  the  legal 
person is  entitle-d  to  remov~ its  representative  at- any  time  on condition  that 
the  representative  is  replaced  immediately  in  such  a  way  as  not  to impede 
the functioning of the supervisory organ.  The removal and replacement must 
be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of the Directive of 9 March 1968. 
Article  6 
The  object  of  entrusting  responsibilities  of management  and  superv1s1on  to 
separate  organs would  be  defeated  if it were  permitted  for  a  person to  be  a · 
member of both organs at the same.  tim~. 
Article  7 
. To increase the  answerabilit_ies  of the management and supervisory  organs· it 
seems  appropriate  to  confirm  the  principle  whereby  the  members  of  these 
organs  can  only_ be  appointed for  specified  periods.  In  this  connection,  the 
Directive  provides  that  no  appointment  may  be  for  a  period  exceeding  six 
years.  Within this limit,  the Member States  may  legislate' as  they  ~ish.  For 
example,  they  may  lay  down  shorter  periods  or periods  of differing  length 
for  first and  subsequent appointments  during  the  company's.  existence.  It 
will  also  be  possible  to provide for  different periods  of appointment for the 
manageme11t. organ and the supervisory organ.  However, in no  case may the 
limit  of six  years  be  exceeded.  For  example  a  rule  could  not  be  adopted 
which provided  for  appointments  of u_nlimited  duration  whilst  allowing  the 
statutes to provide for appointments of limited duration. 
The recognition of the principle that each appointment must be for a specified 
period is  not intended to exclude the possibility of  rene~als. 
5  .. 10/72  ' Article  8 
In. most Member States  the law· contains  special provisions  in respect of the 
remuneration of mell)bers of the management and supervisory organs.  Abuses 
must be avoided and for this purpose it must be forbidden fot such remuneration 
to be fixed by the recipients themselves. 
Article  9 
The  fact  that  a  member  of  the  management  organ  carries  on  an  act1v1ty 
within another ~nterprise may impede the proper discharge of his duties within 
the  company.  · 
The company cannot remain indifferent to such problems, particularly as  the 
two undertakings concerned may be in  competition with each other. 
Steps  must therefore  be  taken  to  prevent  the  interests  of the company. from 
being prejudiced.  Of course, it is  not a  question of forbidding such activities 
entirely, but of making them subject to the company's authorization, whether 
they  are  remunerated  or  not,  and  whether  for  the  account  of  the  person 
concerned or of any other person.  ·  . 
Which  organ  should  be  responsible  for  granting  such  authorization ?  The 
other ·members of the management organ must be excluded as  being likely to 
give their consent too readily.  Nor is the general meeting particularly c·ompetent 
to  judge the effect  of an  outside activity on the company's  affairs.  It is  the 
supervisory organ which is  best suited  t~ fulfilling this task. 
The authorization must not be of a general chara~ter, or of permanent duration. 
It must be sp·ecially  given  for each proposed activity.  Moreover,  the general 
meeting must be  informed each year of the authorizations given. 
A  member  of  a  supervisory  organ  cannot  be  prohibited  from  serving  other 
companies  also.  A  limit  should,  however,  be  placed  on  the  number  of 
companies  in  which  he  can  be  involved,  lest  the  control  exercised  over  the 
management organ should become illusory. 
Article  10 
Member.s  of  management  and  supervisory  organs  must  be  prevented· from 
abusing their  powers  for  the  furtherance  of  their  own  interests  and  to  the. 
detriment of those of the company. 
This danger arises not only when contracts are concluded between the company 
and one of its  members but also  in  the case  of contraCts  in which a  member 
has  an  interest  without  in  fact  being  a  party  thereto.  For  example,  if  a 
member  hold~  ~h<lX~~  in,  o.r  i~  ~  rn~mb~r of  the  supervisory  organ  of,  an 
s.  10/72 enterprise· which· makes  a  contract with  the  company,. there  are grounds  for 
apprehension  that  the  piember's  decision  will  be  taken  not  entirely  lll  the 
interests of the company. 
Naturally  it is  not  a  question  of prohibiting  such  contracts  entirely  but  of 
effectively  supervising them by  making them subject to  authoriz;tion. 
Such supervision is to be carried out by the supervisory organ.  This is obviously 
·so where members of the management board are. concerned with the co~tract in 
question.  -In the event that members. of 'the  supervisory  organ are interested, 
the rule remains the. same since the management organ is not sufficiently  inde~ 
pendent  Of .  the  supervisory  organ.  The  general  meeting  cannot  fulfil  this 
furiction  as it  is  insufficiently well informed.  Of course,  where  authorization 
is  requested  in  favou·r ·of  a  member  of  the  supervisory  organ,  he .must  be 
excluded from the discussion. of the matter:.  Likewise, where a member of the 
management organ has an interest, he must be excluded from discussion within 
that organ on the contract in question.  . This  principle  cannot apply if he is 
the sole  manager,  and  in  this  case  the  only  requirement  is  that he  seek  the 
authorization of the supervisory organ.  · 
The supervisory organ can only exercise effective control if it is  kept informed 
of transactions  giving_ rise .  to · a  conflict  of interest.  The  management  organ 
must  also  receive  such  information  to  enable  it  to  discuss  the  matter with 
full knowledge of the facts  and without the interested member taking part in 
the  vote.  ·  ·  -
As provided'in Article 9, the general meeting must be informed each year of the 
authorizations given by the supervisory  organ~ . 
'  One final  problem must be  dealt with;  the protection of third parties dealing 
with the ·company without knowing whether the  contract in  question  affects 
the  interests  of one  of the  members of the  company's  representative  organs 
or whether authorization has been duly given by the supervisory organ. 
.  . 
Third parties cannot in fact rely on the provisions of Article $(3) of Directive 
151/68/EEC.·of 9 March 1968 whereby limits under the statutes on the powers 
of the organs of the company can never be relied ori  against third parties:  the 
provisions  under consideration  are  not part of. the  statutes  but  of  the  law. 
It ·would  hardly  be  fair  for  third  parties  in  good  faith  to  be  prejudiced, 
therefore  this  Directive provides  that .want of the  necessary  authorization  or 
an· irregularity  in  the  authorization  shall 'only  be  relied  on  against  a  third 
party where  the  company  can  prove that the  third  party was  aware  thereof 
or, in the circumstances, could not have been  unaware thereo.f. 
Article  11 
In order to fulfil its responsibilities,  the supervisory· organ must be  informed 
at regular intervals of the progress of the company's affairs.  For this purpose, 
the.:management· organ  must  submit  a  written  reporti  ar l~ast  ev~ry _thr~e 
months  (paragraph  1).  .  · 
41 The  management  organ  is  also  obliged  to  submit  to  the  supervisory  organ, 
within three months of the end of each financial year, the drafts of the annual 
accounts  and  the  annual  report  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of- the 
Proposal for a Fourth Directive  (paragraph 2).  This obligation is  irrespective 
of whether the accounts are to be adopted by both the organs or by the general 
meeting  (see  Article  48).  ' 
'  Apart from the above-mentioned obligations to supply information, the super-
visory· organ must be able at any time to request from the management organ 
a  special  report on  the  company's  affairs  or any part thereof  (paragraph 3). 
The Directive does not deal with the question whether a  special report should 
contain  information  as  to  the  affairs  of an  undertaking  associated  with  the 
company: this question can only be solved in the context of a general coordina-
_tion  of  company  law.  Certainly  the  supervisory  organ  must- have  all  the 
necessary- powers of obtaining information and making investigations necessary 
for carrying out its task, but these powers must not be confined to that organ 
in  its  entirety.  Indeed it should be  possible  for such. powers to be exercised 
by  a  minority  of the  members  of  the  supervisory  organ  so  as  to avoid  the 
possibility of  cpllusion  between  the  management organ  and  the majority  on 
the supervisory organ.  Furthermore the supervisory organ should be authorized 
to  delegate its  powers to one of more  of its  members or to  experts  qualified 
to  examine  difficult  technical  or  economic  questions  (paragraph  4).  Such 
delegations will not affect the collective responsibility of the supervisory organ. 
To  be  in  a  position  to  discharge  such  responsibility,  each  member  must be 
able  to  examine  all  reports,  documents  and  information  supplied  by  the 
management organ (paragraph 5).  -
Article  12 
The responsibilities of the supervisory organ are limited to the control of the 
management  of  the  company.  This  is  not  however  inconsistent  with  the 
principle that matters of policy and development plans, as  well as other matters 
of major importance to the company, may only be decided on by the manage-
meqt organ with the -consent of the supervisory organ  (paragraph 1).  In the 
same way the law or the statutes may make the_ conclusion of certain contracts 
Sl!biect  to  authorization  by  the  supervisory  organ  (paragraph  2).  These 
provisions  may  refer  to  specific  categories  of ·transactions,  for  example,  the 
acquisition or disposal of immovable property, or may only apply to transactions 
involving  more  than  a  certain  amount  of  money.  It would  be  undesirable 
however  to .  define  transactions  requiring  authorization  so  widely  that  the 
management organ was no longer in charge of the management of the company. 
Moreover,  even  when  authorization  is  requested  for  a  particular  transaction 
it is  still the management organ which decides to go- ahead with the transaction 
a!J-d ensures that it is  brought to its conclusion.  · 
42  s.  10/72 The problem of the  prote~tion of third  parties  in  good  faith  arises  here  as 
it does in Article  10:  where authorization is  required under the statutes, third 
parties  enjoy  the  safeguards  provided  for  in  Article  9  of  Directive 
·No. 68/151/EEC of 9  March 1968.  Where, on the other hand, it is  required 
by law, the rule laid down in  Arti~le 10(4)  of this Directive must apply. 
Article  13 
The supervisory  organ  has  exclusive  competence  to  appoint  and  dismiss  the 
m~ll).bers of the management organ (paragraph 1).  This principle runs counter 
to national provisions which, whilst vesting the power to appoint members of 
the management organ in  the supervisory organ, permit the dismissal  of such 
members  by  the  general  meeting.  In  pra~tice it  is . more difficult  to  have  a 
resolution passed by the. general meeting than by the supervisory organ.  When 
a  member of the management organ is  no  longer capable of carrying out his 
duties a decision as  to his dismissal must be taken as speedily as  possible. 
Where the general meeting  -alone appoints the members· of the supervisory organ 
(Article· 4(4)), only the general  meeting is  competent to  dismiss  them (Article 
13(2)).  Where  the  workers take part in  the  appointment of members  to  the 
supervisory  organ  (Article  4(1)  to  (3))  the  rules  governing  competence  to 
dismiss such members  are in general the same as  those governing competence 
to appoint 'them. 
There is  ari exception, however, in the second example of worker participation 
in which all  the members of the supervisory organ are coopted.  In· this  case 
a  decision to. dismiss  can  only be taken  by  a  court and  on proper grounds. 
The supervisory  orga·n,  the general  meeting  and the workers'  representatives 
are here treated· on an equal footing in that all three are entitled to commence 
the proceedings  in  that behalf. 
Article  14 
As  the  general  ·rules  of  private  law ·relating  to  civil  liability  are  judged 
insufficient, all modern systems of company law contain stricter rules to govern 
the.responsibility of the organs of companies.  This is  also the position adopted 
by  the  Directive,  which  seeks  to. ensure  that  neither  the  statutes  rior  any 
agreement may contain any.exclusion of provisions governing the  responsibili-
ties  of members  of Jhe  management ·and  supervisory organs.  The Directive 
itself  only  lays  down  minimum  rules  and  leaves  the  Me_mber  States  free  to 
introduce or retain stricter provisions.  · 
Members  of the  company's  representative  organs  are  only  liable  where  the 
company has  suffered  damage.  There must therefore be  a  causal  connection · 
between _the  act  complained of and  the  damage  suffered •.  The. laws  of  the 
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Apart from  contravention's of the law or of the statutes, such  a  wrongful  act 
ma-y  arise from negligent management of the company's affairs. 
When  the  company's  representative  organs  have  more  than  one  member,. it 
is  difficuldor a third pat:ty to know which member of the organ is responsible 
for  the  damage.  The  Directive  therefore  provides  that  in  such  cases  the 
members of the organ in question shall be jointly and severally liable, whatever 
the nature of the wrongful act. 
According to  the  principles  of civil  law it is  for the person who has suffered 
damage to ·prove that a wrongful act was  committed  by  the person who has 
caused  it.  If this  rule  were ·applied  in  this  context  it  would  result  in  the 
failure of many actions in  civil liability.  It would be very  difficult for a third 
party to investigate occurrences within the company.  This is  why third parties 
should be  relieved  of the onus of proof, and the members  accused  should be 
obliged  to  prove that no wrongful act is  attributable to  them. 
It is  common  practice  for  the members  of  each  organ  of  the  company  to 
allocate various responsibilities amongst themselves, but other members should 
not be allowed to escape their joint liability on the grounds that the act giving 
rise to damage was within the area of responsibility of one of their colleagues. 
This is  why they· should only be  allowed  to escape such joint liability if they 
can  prove that  they  exercised  proper supervision  over  the  activities  of such-
colleague  and  did  everything  possible  for  the  protection  of  the  company's 
interests  (paragraph  3). 
The law or the statutes require the authorization of the supervisory organ to 
be  obtained  before  certain  contracts  can  be .concluded  with  the  company. 
It would be wrong to assume that the grant of such authorization relieves the 
management organ of any civil  liability  (paragraph 4). 
What are the effects  on the  civil  liability of the  management and supervisory 
organs of  a  resolution of the general  meeting giving  a  discharge,  instructions 
or. authorization  with  regard  to  an  act which  has  given  rise  to  damage  fer 
the  company ? 
In  view  of modern  trends  in  company law  su~h discharge  can no  longer be 
considered as a waiver of the right to bring an action in civil liability.  In most 
ca~es the shareholders have insufficient information to appreciate all the circum-
stances  which  might  lead  to  damage.  · ·For  the  same  reasons  authorizations 
and  even  instructions  given  by  the  general  meeting  cannot  relieve  the 
representative organs of the coJ:llpany  of dvil liability  (paragraph 5). 
44 Article  15 
The preceding Article  lays  down  the substantive rules  relating  to  actions  on 
behalLof-the company against members  of the  management and  supervisory 
organs.  .  The purpose of this  Article  is  to clarify  a  rule of procedure.  The 
laws of all the Member States provide that such an action must be commenced 
when the general meeting demands it.  (paragraph 1).  ; 
-This  safeguard. would, however,  be of no effect if the taking of the decisidn 
by the shareholders were subject .to _excessively  strict conditions.  This is  why 
the Directive provides that in no case may a majority be required greater than 
an  absolute  majority  of  the  votes  of  shareholders  present  or  represented. 
(paragraph  2).  · 
krticle 16 
In practice it is  quite difficult to secure the _commencement  of proceedings on 
behalf of the company through a demand by rhe general meeting, owing to the 
confidence  which  the  majority  of  shareholders  have  in  the  management  and 
supervisory organs.  Therefore, following the example of several national hiws, 
the Directive gives minority shareholders the right to secure the commencement 
of  proceedings. 
The detailed  rules  of procedure. to be  followed  by  the  minority shareholders 
will  have to be laid down by  the  Member States.·  In  general it is  necessary 
that  the .group  of shareholders  should hold  5  or 10  per  cent of the capital 
subscribed  to  exercise  the  minority  right  of  action.  The  Directive  sets  a 
maximum of 5  per cent,  for the possible  protection  of the. right of minority .. 
shareholders.  This maximum, which is  a  percentage of the issued  capital, is 
still ·insufficient  as  regards  companies  above  a  certain  size  and· accordingly, 
apart froth the reference to capital subscribed, it is also possible for shareholders 
holding  shares . with  a  nominal  valye  or  proportional  value  of  at  least 
100 000 units of account to secure the commencement of proceedings on behalf 
of the .company.  ·  ·  · 
However,  the Directive only lays .down  minim~m rules  of protection and the 
Mer:p.ber  States  are  free  to grant this  right to one shareholder .alone without 
making it subject to the holding of a specified proportion of the capital. 
Article  17  · 
The purpose of the last two. preceding Articles  is  to lay down the conditions 
under  which  proceedings  may  be  commenced  on  behalf  of  the  company. 
Further safeguards  are  required, however, .  to  render these  principles  effective. 
The Directive therefore prohibits any provision under the law, in  the statutes 
or in .any  agreement subjecting the commencement of such proceedings  to  a· 
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to the rights of minority. shareholders, referred to in Article 16.  These minori-
ties  must be able to secure the commencement of proceedings on behalf of the 
company  without having  to submit the  whole  matter to  the general  meeting 
in  advance. ·  This would  in  most cases  only  be a  waste of time  and  money. 
(subparagraph (a)).  · 
Finally, the commencement of proceedings on behalf of the company must not 
be made subject to a prior decision of the Court in respect of wrongful. acts of 
the members of the representative organs of the company, or in respect of the 
replacement of such members (subparagraph (b)). 
Article  18. 
The Directive  does  not exclude the possibility  of a  renunciation of the right 
to  bring proceedings  on  behalf  of  the  company  but such  renunciation  must 
obviously be subject to certain safeguards to preserve the effect of the safeguards 
attached to the exercise of the right.  Certain decisions by the general meeting, 
therefore; such as  the approval of the accounts, or the granting of a discharge, 
in  respect  of the financial  year  during which  the  acts  giving  rise  to  damage 
occur,  must not be  taken as  implying that the shareholders no longer wish to 
proceed against the members responsible for the damage (paragraph 1). 
Furthermore, the Directive lays down minimum conditions for effecting a valid. 
renunciation (paragraph 2).  In the first place, this  can only take place as  the 
result of an  express  resolution  on  a  subject  appearing  in  the  agenda  of the 
general meeting and dealing with the facts in question, and where the members 
have  been fully  informed of such facts  and of the damage which could result 
therefrom  for  the  company.'  Also  the  minority  shareholders  referred  to  in 
- Article  16  should  be  entitled  to  object  to  such  renunciation  in  spite  of the 
resolution  of  the  general  meeting;  for  this  it  is  necessary  that such  minority 
should have voted against the renunciation or have made an objection thereto 
recorded in the minutes of the meeting.· 
The  provisions  of  this  Article  apply  also  to  any  compromise  between  the 
company  and  a  member  of  one  of  its  organs,  where  the  liability  of  such 
member is  in question (paragraph 3). 
Article  19 
It would not be just for  credit~rs to be denied payment because the company 
does not commence proceedings against members of the management or super..: 
visory organs (paragraph 1).  This problem is  dealt with under the procedures 
for arrangements with creditors -and bankruptcy under which the administrator 
is,  in  general,  empowered  to  call  the debtors  of the person concerned before 
· the court.  However, other safeguards,  apart from  these procedures,  niust be 
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laws of the Member States, the Directive gives creditors the right to commence 
proceedings on behalf of the company but without, as  is  the case under certain 
national  laws,  confining  it  to  cases  where  a  member .  of  the representative 
organs  has  committed  grave  offences~  The  company  must  furthermore  be 
prevented from depriving the creditor of this  right by  means of a  compromise 
or renunciation of the right to commence proceedings:  such acts  could not be 
relied on against creditors (paragraph 2). 
Article  20 
The provisions of Article 14 .  tq 19  of this  Directive  are  concerned  only with 
the commencement of proceedings on behalf of the company,  but the acts  of 
members. of the management  and  supervisory  organs  may  also  directly  harm 
the personal interests of shareholders or third parties, in  a way quite different 
,  from  cases in which the interests of the shareholders as  a  whole  are affected, 
by reason of the diminution caused  by  the damage to  the value of their stake 
in  the  company.  The  Directive  ensures  equivalent  and  effective  protection 
. by applying to actions brought by individuals the principles of joint and several 
liability  and of the  reversal  of the  burden  of  proof.  Likewise. such  aqions 
cannot be barred by any resolution of the general meeting or supervisory organ. 
These rules are without prejudice to national provisions under which companies 
must in  all  circumstances  be  responsible  for  the  acts  of  their  representative 
organs. 
Article  21 
The severity of the rules relating to the civil liability of members of the manage-
ment and supervisory organs is  tempered in most legal systems by the applica-
tion of periods of limitation which are much shorter than those under general . 
civil law.  However, the fixing by Member States of periods that are too short 
must be avoided.  The  Direc~ive therefore lays down a minimum of three years. 
These' provisions apply to proceedings on behalf of the company and to pro-
ceedings by individual shareholders or third parties. 
CHAPTER III 
General meeting 
For a whole range of matters of major importance to the company a resolution 
of the general  meeting is  required.  For example one need only turn to Arti-
cles 9, 16, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32 and 33  of the Proposal for a Second Directive, 
and Articles 4,  ~9, 20 and 21  of the Proposal for a Third Dir(;!ctive. 
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meeting.  The object of the provisions of Chapter III of this Directive is  not to 
make certain transactions by the company dependent on a resolution of all the 
shareholders,  but to  protect  the  latter  in  the exercise  of their  rights  during 
general meetings and against certain resolutions taken in general meetings. 
Article  22 
In accordance with a principle common to all legal systems, the general meeting 
· must be convened at least once a year (paragraph 1).  This is  necessary for the 
rendering of the annual accounts.  But in view of the many matters for which 
a  resolution of the general meeting is  required, it should also be possible for it 
to be convened as  an9.  when necessary for  the management of the company. 
The management organ must therefore  have  an unlimited  power to convene 
general meetings, which must in no way be restricted by  the law or the statutes 
(paragraph  2). 
Once  this  minimum safeguard  is  ensured,  Member States  can  be left  free  to 
grant, by  law or under statutes, the right to  convene· general meetings  to any 
other persons, for example the auditors, the liquidators of the company or the 
supervisory  organ. 
Article  23 
Minority shareholders, as  defined in Article  16, who are entitled to commence 
proceedings on behalf of the company against members of the management and 
supervisory organs,  or to prevent the renunciation of the right  to  commence 
'such  proceedings,  must  also  be  able  to  demand  that  a  general  meeting  be 
: convened  (paragraph  1). ·  · 
Abuse of this power by shareholders must however be avoided.  As  the  orga~s 
of the company cannot be the final arbiters in the matter, shareholders should 
be authorized to bring the matter before the court on the expiry of one month 
after  their demand to the  company.  .  Member States  must organize the  legal 
procedure involved, particularly the details of convening the meeting under the 
order of the court (paragraph 2). 
Article 24 
General  meetings  must be convened in  such  a  way that all  shareholders may 
h;1:ve  knowledge thereof.  Where  only  registered  shares  are issued  by  a .com-
pany, and .the names  and addresses  of all  the  shareholders are entered in  the 
Company's registers, the Directive provides that the notice of meeting may be 
sent to each of the shareholders by  registered letter.  In other cases  the notice 
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of Directive No 68/151/EEC of 9  March 1968, in which  a:ll, the  information 
relating to the company is  published (paragraph 1). 
.  . 
Such  publication  must take  pla_ce  at least ·once,  but national provisions  may 
require publication· on  more than one oGcasion,  or publication elsewhere,  for 
example in daily newspapers, in  addition to publication in the national gazette 
mentioned  above. 
The Din!cdve lays down minimum contents for the notice of meeting (parigraph 
2).  The information required under (a)  and (b)  call for no comment, but it is 
irripcirtant 'for  the . shareholder  to  know ·whether  he  is  being  called  to  an  -
ordinary,  extriwrdinary or special  meeting,  since  according  to. the type  of 
meeting convened; different rules  as  to quorum  ~nd majority may apply.  The 
formalities under the Statutes relating to. attendance at the meeting and voting 
thereatmust also be communicated (see (d)).  Any limitation under the statl.ites 
on the choice  of persons  as  agents  for shareholders  must also be  mentioned 
in the notice (see  (e)).  In all cases details must _be  given of the agenda (see  (f)) 
and t,he  proposed. resolutions on each of the  subjects  therein (see  (9))  set out 
in  such  a  way  that  their  wording  and  content  can  be  readily  appreciated 
without the need to refer to other documents.  ... 
All  the legal systems  have· provisions relating to the periods between the date 
of the notice .and the  date of the  meeting  but such periods  vary  among the 
Member States between 5 days and one month.  -
A common soiutjon cannot be  fo~nd by  compromising between :these various 
periods.  Shareholders. should  have  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to  make 
arrangements  to  attend  or  be  represented  at  the  general  meeting,  since  an 
increasing number of shareholders niay.  be  resident outside the country wher!! 
the  company's  registered  office  is  situated,  and  too short a  period  of notice 
would prevent them from replying to the notice.  Besides, the rules iptroduced 
by- the  Directive  for  the  repn!sentation  of shareholders  (Article  28)  and  for. 
amendments to the agenda by minority shareholders· (Article 25) cannot operate 
unless periods of notice  are sufficiently  long.  This  is  why the  Directive  lays 
_ down a  uniform period of one  month.  An  exception is  envisaged,  however, 
for  companies  which  have  issued  only  registered  shares:  a _notice  of  meeting 
addressed ·to each shareholder personally by  registered letter may be sent only 
two weeks before the date fixed for the meeting..  . 
These  periods  need  only  run  f~om the  date  of the  first  publi<;ation  of  the 
notice of meeting, or of the first registered letter enclosing the notice,  and the 
_  date· of the first meeting of the. general meeting.  Member States may prescribe 
other periods  either for  the  renewal  of the  notice  or for  the  reconvening  of 
meetings with. the same agenda (paragraph 3).  · 
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The  minority  shareholders,  who  have  the  right to demand the  convening of 
a  general  meeting must also  be  able  to request the inclusion  of one or more 
new items in  the agenda for a meeting of which notice ha-s  already heen given. 
It is  possible  that different  minorities  may  propose  different  changes  to  the 
agenda  for  the  same· meeting.  Given  the  period  of  notice  of  one  month, 
requests  for  the  inclusion  of new  items  may  only be-made during the period 
of  ten  days  following  publication  of  the  notice,  so  that  tht:  company  may_ 
· inform all the shareholders of the agenda as  so modified, by the same me~hods 
as  the notice of meeting, at least ten  days before the meeting.·  · 
Where notice is  sent by registered letter at least two weeks. before the meeting 
the two periods of ten days mentioned above are reduced to five days. 
Article 26 
The Member States are to l"ay  down  the  formalities  to  be  complied  with "by 
shareholders in  order to attend the  meeting.  Three sorts of formality  are in 
general  use:  . 
1.  the depo;it of the share certificates  with  ~ notary, with a  bank or with 
the company itself; · 
2.  notice of attendance given by the shareholder to the company; 
3.  with regard to registered shares, the entry of the holder in respect thereof 
in the company's registers.  · 
The  Directive  impliedly  prohibits  the  imposing  of  further  conditions,  other 
. than these  procedural  formalities,  on  admission  to  general  meetings.  Thus, 
for example, the laws of the Member States cannot require a minimum number· 
of shares to be  held in  the  company, or deny  admission  to the meeting to  a 
shareholder whose shares are not fully  paid up.  \ 
The Directive :only deals  with the  admission  of shareholders  and leaves  it to 
the Member States to speaify what other· categories-of persons may also attend 
general  meetings.  Finally,  this  Article  does  not  deal ·with  conditions  for · 
exercising voting rights, which are governed by Article 33. 
Article  27 
It often happens that a shareholder is  unwilling or unable to attend a  general 
meeting,  particularfy  if  he  re"sides  in  a  country  other  than  that  where  the 
company's  registered  office  is  situated.  The  law  in  all  the  Member  States 
. therefore  makes  provision  fo~  shareholders  to  be  represented  at  meetings. 
This Directive confirms this right to be represented and prohibits any provision 
of law to the contrary (paragraph 1). 
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In  certain  ~ompanies .it  may  be.  desirable  to  limit the  categories  of petsons 
who  may be  appointed  as  vepresentatives.  These· restrictions  should  be  laid 
down in the statutes and it should always  be  possible for a shareholder to be 
· represented by another shareholder (paragraph 2). 
To fa.cilitate  ptoof of appointment as.  representative,  the  form of proxy must 
always  be completed in  writing and must be  delivered to the company which 
must keep it at least three years, that is  to say, during the same period of time 
for  which  it must keep  the other documents  relating to  the meeting,  such as 
the list of members present and the minutes ,(paragraph 3). 
Article· 28 
The provisions of Artide 27 are insufficient to meet cases where the company, 
or. other  bodies  such  as  associations  of  shareholders  .or  credit  institutions; 
request shareholders to  send  them  their forms  of proxy and offer to appoint 
· representatives for  them.  ·  · 
It is  of course for the Member States  to  set up such systems  of representation 
but the safeguards for shareholders'  in the various countries should be equivalent 
and the  Directive ·therefore  lays ·down  a  series  of  additional  conditions ·for 
these· forms of representation. 
First, the  sharehold~r must not be  ~riduiy bo~nd to the representative selected: 
the  appointment  must  therefore  be limited to one  meeting,  whilst remaining 
valid,-however, for  any further meeting on the same agenda  (paragraph 1  (a)). 
In any case the .appointment may be revoked at any time (see  (b)).  The purpose 
of these  arrangements  as  regards  representation  is  to  ena:ble  as  many share-
holders  as  possible  to take part in  the  meeting ·through their representatives.' 
It would therefore be contrary to this principle to permit organizations to seek 
a~pointments from amongst one class only of shareholders (see  (c)). 
It is  not, however, sufficient to mobilize in  this  way shareholders who do not 
wish to atten_d, and are willing to have their voting rights exercised by represen- ,• 
tatives;  it must  be ensure4' that representatives  vote  in  conformity  with the · 
wishes  and in~  the  interests  of their  principals.  Therefore  every .request for 
appointment as representative inust be accompanied by a request for instructions 
as  to .voting and all· necessary information relating to the items  on  the agenda 
and the proposed resolutions in each such item.  · 
In  spite  of  these  provisions  it  is  corrimon  practice  for  shareholders  to  be 
blindly confident in the establishments which arrange their representation and 
to  omit to giye  any  instructions.  it should  be ·compulsory therefore  for the 
representative to indicate on the request for  appointment how he will  vote in 
the·absence.of instrw;tions (see  (d)). 
The representative  would thus  be  bound,  if  not by  the instructions. given  by 
his  principal,  then  by  his  own statement as  to  his  voting intentions  (see  (e)). 
This rule applies equally in cases  where_ the  company itself makes  requests for 
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shareholder giving instructions co.ntrary to the-proposals of the organs of the 
company.  In fact he represents not the company but the shareholder, and the 
latter is  in most· cases unable to find anyone else to represent him. 
As  an  exceptional  measure,  a· representative  should  be  authorized  to ·depart. 
fro·m  the instructions received or statement made where, as  a result of circum-
stances hitherto unknown, the exercise of voting rights as indicated b¥ reference 
to a superseded situation might result in damage being suftered by the principal 
(see (f)).  In -such a case the representative must inform the principal immediately 
and provide all  relevant information  (see  (g)). 
Article  29 
A list of persons present is  to be drawn up in respect of each general meeting 
in  order  to  verify  the  identity  of  those  attending  and  to  ascertain  whether 
requirements as to quorum and majorities are fulfilled:  This list should contain 
the  names  and  addresses  of shareholders  present  or  represented  and,  where 
appropriate, of their representatives.  The number,  class,  nominal or propor-
tional  valu.e  of,  and  the  number  of  votes  attaching  to  the  shares  of  each 
shareholder present or represented should also  appear· in the list.  As  a  result, 
national provisions permitting a member to have his votes cast by a representa-
. tive without revealing his identity cannot remain in  force.  It is essential that 
such  ~ight o.f  ;monymous voting be _abolished as  facts may come to light during 
· the same meeting which result in a shareholder being disqualified from voting 
(Article  34). 
The Directive does not req~ire the Member St~te~ to follow any specified form 
for drawing up the list of those present.  Unless it calls  upon the services of a 
notary, the company is  fully responsible for ensuring that the list is  established 
and properly prepared. 
This document is primarily for the information of persons attending the meeting 
and they must be  able to inspect it from the beginning of the meeting.  After 
the  meet.ing,  furthermore,  it  must  be  kept  available  for  inspection  by  every 
shareholder,  whether  or not he  was  present· or  represented  at  the  meeting. 
For this purpose the list ofmembers present must be attached to the minutes, 
which must be kept for three years  (Article· 41(4)). 
Article 30 
As  regards  certain  resolutions  to  be  proposed  at  the  general  meeting  the 
particulars given in the notice of meeting do not give sufficient information to 
shareholders.  To remedy  this  deficiency,  the  Directive .provides  that certain 
documents must be available to every shareholder at the latest from the date of 
despatch  or  publication  of the  notice  of  meeting.·  These  are  primarily  the 
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accordance with the Proposal for  a  Fourth Directive  but shareholders should 
also have  access  to  copies  of  contracts  for  which  the  authorization  of  the 
gen~ral meeting i~ requested. 
Article  31' 
It is  not enough  that shareholders  should have  the right ·to put questions  at 
general meetings to the company's managers; it is  also essential that the. latter 
be obliged to supply the information requested.  -
This obligation is,  however, subject to certain restrictions.  Thus, in the first 
place, information concerning the affairs of the company is  only' given if it is 
ncessary  to  enable  an  objective  assessment  to  be  made  of the  items  on  the 
agenda (paragraph 1) .. The Directive does not deal with the question whether 
the right to information extends to cover the affairs of undertakings connected 
with the company: this question will be solved as  pa-rt of the harmonization of  ; 
laws relating to groups of companies. 
Seco-ndly,  information  requested  may  be  refused  where  to  give  it  might  be 
detrimental  to  the  company  or would _run  counter  to  a  legal  obligation  of 
secrecy_ (paragraph 3).  · 
Apart from  these  restrictions  on  the  duty  tci  give  information,  the  M·ember 
States  may  not introduce  ariy  further  grounqs  for  refusal:  for  example,  the 
amounts of certain taxes or the difference between the book ·value and the real 
value of certain items in the balance sheet are  not to  b~ treated as  matters on. 
which information may be· refused. 
The management organ is  responsible for supplying information (paragraph 2), 
but  Member  States  may .also. vest  this  responsibility  in  other  persons,  for 
example the supervisory organ or the auditors. 
In  practice  the  management  organ  and  the  sh~reholder  are  not  often  in 
agr~ement as  to whether information requested should be given or not.  Power 
to decide such questions should not be given to the general meeting, as it could 
not be' relic::d  upon to decide objectively. 
Power should therefore· be given  to  the court· to  decide  whether ·a refusal  to 
give information is  justified.  -
The  court's .judgment can  deal  at the  same  i:i~e with  rhe  question  whether-
resolutions  passed  by  the  meeting in  contravention  of  a  member's  right  to. 
receive information are vo.id or voidable  (A~ticle 42(d)).  .  .  - '  . 
Article  32 
In  accordance with  a  principle comh19n  to  all  the legal  systems,  the  general 
meeting may not pass any resolution concerning items which'-do not appear in 
the  agenda  communicated  or published  in  accordance  with  Article  24(2)  or 
, Article 25(3).  ·  · 
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present .  or represented  at  the  meeting  and  no  .obje~tion. is  re~orded in  the 
minutes  (paragraph  2).  · 
At  the  ~hoi~e  of  the  national  legislator,  three  types  of  resolution  may  be 
passed without having been included in the agenda  (paragraph 3). 
An  a~t!on may be brought at any time for a declarat.ion that a resolution passed 
in  ~ontravention of paragraph 1 is  void or voidable. 
Article  33 
.  The  shareholder;s  right to  vote  must. be  proportionate to the  fra~tion of the 
~apitaJ subs~ribed which his shareholdirig represents  (paragraph 1).  However, 
it is not the purpose of the Directive to prevent Member States from authorizing 
certain  ex~eptions to this principle.  · 
The first exception recognized by the Directive is  the authorization of so-called 
"Preferred"  shares  by  which  a  company  can  meet  special  needs  for  finance. 
The disadvantage of the restricti_on  or even the exclusion of voting rights must 
be  compensated 'by  granting the  holders  of such shares special  advantages  by 
comparison with other shareholders, for example in respect of dividends or as 
regards distribution of assets  upon liquidation· (paragraph 2(a)). 
Se~ondly, national provisions limiting the number of votes in respect of shares 
·allotted  to  one  shareholder  may  remain  in  force.  These  measures  must, 
hbw~ver, apply to  all  the shareholders or at least to all  holders  of shares  of 
the .same class  (par.agraph 2  (b)).  · 
These· exceptions to the principle of the proportionality of votes to shareholdings 
may only  be  introduced in  the  statutes.  No further exceptions  are .provided 
for.  · For example it would be forbidden to grant a double vote to holders of 
fully  paid-up :shares  upon  their  having  held .  such shares  for  a  certain ·length 
of  time.  . 
Upon  the  formation  of  the  company,  the  capital  subscribed  _should  not  be 
entirely paid up.  Article 6 of the Proposal for a Second Dire~tive provides that. 
shares should be ·paid up as  to 25  %  in q1sh  and that further calls  should be 
made as  and when required by  the company.  No shareholder should be able 
to exer~ise his right to vote until he  has paid up all calls made by the company 
(paragraph  3). 
.  .  . 
From  this  must be  distinguished  the ·question  of the  effect  on voting  rights 
where  shares  are  only  partly  paid  up  because  the  company  has  not  made 
further calls.  Following the laws  of five  of the Member States, the Directive 
prohibits _in  alL cases  any  exception to the  prin~iple of proportionality.  The 
company  should  not  be  able  to  wield  any  influence  over  the  number  of 
shareholders'  votes. 
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In  th~ event of a conflict of interests between the  comp~ny and a  ~hareholder, , 
the  latter must not  be  allowed  to  exercise  his  right  to  vote.  ~  The Qirective 
lays  down· four cases  in which this prohibition must apply. 
A shareholder who is  also a member of the management or-supervisory organs · 
-must not  take  part  in  the  vote  on  their  discharge  (see  (a)).  Of  course, :the 
granting  or  ~efusal of  a  discharge  does  not  ha~e direct  effe;cts  such  as  the 
immediate  dismissal  of  the . members  concerned  or  the  commencement  of 
proceedings  against  them  on  behalf· of  the  corhpany,  But the  vote  on .the 
~ischarge should not be considered as a mere formality: it is the most importan~ 
means available· to the general meeting for the expression of its  confiderice or 
otherwis'e  in  the  management of the company.  - .  .  - . 
Furthermore, no shareholder may vote when  ~he general meeti~g is  called upon 
to  decide  whether  to  exercise  rights  against  him  on  behalf  of the  company· 
.or to release him fr~m obligations to the company (see  (b)  ·a~d(c)). 
Certain agreements to which the company is  to be· a party require the consent 
of the general  meeting.  Where such  a  contract· is  to be  entered  into  with. a 
shareholder, the latter must als9 be excluded from the vote (see  (d)).  · 
In no case  may the statutes provide for'-anyexceptions to or derogations from 
the prohibitions on voting referred to above.  These principles must be observed 
even where the result is  to exclude froq1 the ·vote  a  majority  of shareholder_s · 
who have an  interest which is  not that of .the  company and to limit the vote 
to  a  ~inority of disinterested  shareholders.  · 
The prohibitions in  question apply not only to  shareholders but. also  to their 
. representatives.  Also  they  apply to shareholders  ~hether they  are  voting in 
respect of their own ·shares or the shares of another.  · 
Article  3S 
There are wide differences  between the  rules  in the  Member-States~governing 
vqting. agreements.  As  the Directive  only lays  down minimum  provisions~ it 
is  limited  tQ  combating  the  most· flagrant  abuses.  For this  purpose  it  lays 
down cot?ditions 'in which such agreements  are  in all  cases  void. · ·  · 
· In the first place ali  agreements  whereby  a  sharehoider undertakes  al~ays to 
follow  the  instructions  of  the  co~pany  are  void  (see  (a)).  Furthertnore; 
shareholders rimst not agree ·always  to approve the proposals of the organs ·of 
the  company,  as  this  would  deprive  the  general  meeting  of its  controlling 
function  (see  (b)). 
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between  shareholders  and  third  parties  cannot  be  prohibited  entirely;  they 
may be justified, for example, as  an essential part of a  consortium agreement. 
However, the. pure purchase of votes  by  the ·granting of special advantages is 
in all cases unlawful (see  (c)). 
It must  be  recalled  that  although  the  Directive  provides  that certain  voting 
agreements  shall  be  void,  it  makes  no  comment  as  to  their effect . on votes 
which are cast in p).lrsuance of such void  agreements. 
Article 36 
This provision lays down the necessary majority for resolutions of the general 
meeting,  namely  an  absolute  majority  of  members  present  or  represented 
(paragraph  1).  Resolutions  can  accordingly  only  be  passed  if  they  receive 
the votes of one half of the persons mentioned plus one.  One exception only 
is  provided  for  in  the  case  of  appointments  (paragraph  2)  which  may  be 
effected by relative majorities.  This permits inter alia the making of appoint-
ments by methods which ensure  the  representation  of minorities. 
The Directive does not prevent Member States from requiring larger majorities 
for certain resolutions.  Large  majorities are in  any case  already required for 
increases  or reductions  of  capital  (Articles  22  and  27  of the Proposal  for a 
Second Directive) for mergers  (Article 4 of the Proposal for a  Third Directive) 
and for alterations to the statutes (Artide 37 of this Directive). 
Larger . majorities  may  als.o  be  required . by  the  statutes  for  all  or  certain 
resolutions. 
Article  37 
The object of this provision is  to ensure that any alteration to the statutes is 
submitted to  the general meeting (paragraph 1).  Exceptions to this  principle 
· are permitted only i.n  three closely-defi.ned  cases  (paragraph 2). 
When  the general meeting  delegates  to  the  management organ certain  trans-
actions which entail for their completion an alteration to the statutes, it must 
be. possible  for  the  management organ to  be  empowered to  alter the statutes 
(see  (a)).  For example, an authorization to issue further capital within a fixed 
maximum (see  Article 22(2)  of  the Proposal for a _Second  Directive)  may also 
include  authorization to  alter the  amount shown in  the statutes· as  being the 
amount of the capital subscribed, and this may also be the case where conver-
tible debentures are converted. 
1 
The management organ  may  also  be empowered  to  alter the  statutes  where 
such alteration is  required by an  administrati~e authority and,  under the law 
applicable,  the prior consent of such authority is  required for such  alteration 
to be  valid  (see  (b)).  · 
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In  view  of  the  wide  area  of  coordination  yet  to  be  achieved  in  this  field, 
company  laws _-.will  be  modified  further  on  several  occasions.  Where  such 
future  modifications  necessarily  entail  alterations  to the  statutes,  it  would 
be· pointless  to  require  that every- such  operation should be sanctioned  by  a 
resolution_ of the general meeting (letter  (c)). 
Article  38 
The  particulars  to  be  included  in  notices  o-f  general  meeting· pursuant  to 
Article 24(2)  would not in most cases  give  shareholders sufficient information 
for a decision on an alteration of the statutes.  In such case the notice should 
also include the full text of the proposed alterations. 
Article 39 
Following the ~xa~ple of the laws of five Men;tber States the Directive provides 
that resolutions  of the general  meeting to  alter the  statutes should be passed 
by a  qualified  majority.  This majority cannot be less  than two-thirds of the_ 
votes carried by shares represented at the meeting or of  the capital subscribed 
represented  thereat  (paragraph 1). 
National provisions_ which permit smaller majorities either for all or for certain 
resolutions  (e.g.  increases  of capital)  are  incompatible with such Community 
rule as  aforesaid.  'On the other hapd it will  be  possible to lay down, by law 
or  in  the  statutes,  stricter  conditions which,  where  appropriate,  could  vary 
according to  the  type  of  alteration  proposed  to  the  statutes.  The  Directive 
is  also  without prejudice to  national  rules  requiring the consent of all  share-
hold~rs for certain -resolutions of  great importance  . 
. ( 
Where the required majority is  not obtained at the first  meeting, certain legal. 
systems provide that a second meeting may be convened at which the resolution 
may be _passed  by a  smaller majority. · The Directive ·does not affect systems 
permitting  two consecutive  meetings  with  the  same  agenda.  However,  the 
. minimum  two-thirds  majority  mus_t  always  be  observed,  no  matter at what 
meeting  the  resolution  is  passed.  One  exception  should  be  made.· to  this 
principle. 
Some  legal  systems,  besides. the majorities  required  for  resolutions,  lay  d~wn 
also  a  smaller quorum for the second-meeting than for the  first.  But where 
the law applicable provides  that the resolution· can only be passed j£ half of 
all the shareholders are present, it would be excessive. to insist that, in addition, 
two-thirds at least of those present be in favour of the alteration ·proposed to. 
the  statutes.  In  this  case  the  absolute  majority· required  by  Article  36 will 
suffice (paragraph 2).  · 
s.  10/72  57 The  Directive  does  not  follow  the  example  of  certain  national  laws  which 
require the minut~s recording the resolutions in question' to be authenticated by 
notarial  act.  In  this  context,  however,  the  provisions  of  Directive  No. 
68/151/EEC  of -9  March  1968  should  be  borne in  mind,  which  provide  that 
every alteration ·to  the statutes must be. published.  Finally, the Directive does 
not prevent any Member State from submitting the registration of an alteration 
to  prior inspection by  a  court or administrative authority. 
In  a  societe  anonyme'f  the  shareholder's  obligation  is  limited  to  paying  up 
his  shares.  It follows  from  this· principle  that an  increase  in  the obligations 
of shareholders cannot be voted on by the majorities laid down· for alterations 
to the statutes.  The approval of all  shareholders  involved  must be· obtained 
(paragraph  3). 
Article  40 
·Further rules  must be  laid  down for  cases  where  the  company Issues  several 
classes  of  shares.  Where  measures  are  proposed  which .  would  entail  an 
alteration in the.relationship between the classes of shares, not·only a resolution 
in general meeting is  necessary, but also  a separate vote at least ori the part of 
·the holders  of shares of a _class  to  which the resolution  in  question could  be 
detrimental  (see  Article  22(3)  of the  Proposal for  a  Second Pirective) .. Such 
a vote is  of course subject to the majorit)r requirements laid down in Article 39. 
Article  41' 
Minutes must be  drawn up  of each general  meeting  (paragraph -1).  It is  for 
Member  States  to  decide  whether  the  minutes  should  be  authenticated  by 
notar.ial  act.  The  Directive  however  lays  down  the  minimum  particulars 
which  must  appear  therein.· 
These are, firstly,  the place and date of the meeting,  the subject-matter of the 
resolutions  and  the  results  of the·  voting.  Where  a  shareholder has  objected 
to  the  discussion of a particular item  of business,  this  must also  be recorded. 
The latter  point is  particul~rly important for  the  purposes  ot actions  under 
Article 43(b)  attacking resolutions of the general meeting as  void or voidable. 
There must be;!  attached to the minutes the list of memb-ers  present (Artide 29) 
and the documents relating to the convening of the general meeting, i.e. copies 
of the published or letter-form notice of meeting provided  for  in Article  24. 
•  Where the Fren~h terms are used in  this Explanatory Memorandum they are to be taken to 
include  a  reference 'to  l:he  corresponding  types  of  company  existing  in· each  of  the  six 
Member  States.  ·  ' 
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it does  not seem  necessary that the. minutes should be  filed  in the register  ~£ 
the company in accordance with Article  3(2)  of Directive No. ·68/151/EEC. of 
9  March  1968.  It must --be  remembered,  however,  that  Article  1  of  that 
Directive  requires  the disclosure  of certain resolutions of the. general  meeting 
which are also of interest to third parties.  Other requirements as to disClqsure 
·ar~ .  contained in the provisions ofthe 2nd and 3rd DireCtives,  for example in 
respect of  resolutions increasin'g or reducing the capital or ori .mergers;  . 
Article 42 
Shareholders  must  be  protected  against infringements  of  national  provlstons 
in  conformity  with  this  Directi~e relating to. the  preparation. and. conduct of 
general  meetings,  particularly in  the  case  of infringements. which  might have 
some influence over the· resolutions passed.  · 
The laws  of the  Member States  contain  two  kinds  of sanction:  a'  resolution 
is  either void or voidable.  In  the first case  the  resolution is  autoffi'atically  of 
no legal effect, in the second case it is  treated as  valid  until it ·is  declared void 
- by the court.  The Directive does not seek to answer the question as  tq whic~ 
,infringements  should. be  visited with orie  sanction or the  other,.  To  achi_eve 
equivalence of shareholder protection -it is  sufficient to specify which infringe-
ments· always render a resolution void o'r  voidable.  However, the list of these 
contained  in  the Directive  only  concerns  breaches  of the  provisions  of these 
Community rules.  In other words, the  Member States  are  f~ee 'to  introd~ce 
. similar sanctions against other infringements, for example infringements of .the 
principle of equal treatment of  shareh~lders, good faith· or morality, or cases 
of abuse of power.  ·  ·  .  . · ·  ·  ·  .  · 
The Directive is  mainly concerned with infringements relating to the formalities 
and time limits-laid down for· the convening of meetings (Articles 42(a) and 24(1) 
and (3)).·  However, as  regards. the minimum ~ontents of the. notice of meeting 
(Article  24(2),  only  the  omission· of the  place  or date of the meeting,  or of 
details  of  the  formalities  to. be  fulfilled  in · order ·to  attend· and  vote,  will 
render void or voidable any resolution passed at such meeting.  . 
:Refusal to allow. a. shareholder to  attend. a  meeting must have the .same re~rilt, 
where he has completed the formalities required  (Article  41(c)). · Furthermore, 
a resolution of the genenil ·meetJ.ng will be void or voidable if its  subject~matt~r 
was not communicated or published in the. notice (Article 24(2)  (f)  or when new 
items. were ·  adped  to  the  agenda  at  the  reqi.u!st  of  minority  shareholders 
(Article  25(3)) ..  An  exception .must  be  made  for  the· cases  referred· to  in. 
Article  32  (2)  and . (3)  where;  as  an  exceptional  measure,  matters. may  be 
discuss.ed  which do not appear on the agenda (Article 42(b)).  · 
Shareholders  called  upon to vote  the  adoption  of the  annual  accounts  or to 
consent to certain contracts must be supplied with additional written informa-
tion  (Article  31).  Also,  at each  general  meeting,  every  shareholder  has  the 
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will also render resolutions void or voidable where there is a connection between 
the subject matter of the resolutions and the documents or information refused 
(Article  42(d)). 
Infringements  of  the  provisions  on  the  exercise  of  voting  rights  are  also 
regulated herein.  One can quote as  an example the case where a  shareholder 
casts more votes t_han  he is  entitled to by virtue of his shareholding (Article 33) 
or where  a  shareholder votes  despite  being  excluded  by  reason  of a  conflict 
of interests  (Article  34).  It is  necessary  in  these  cases,  however,  that  such 
infringements should have  affected the results  of the v<;>ting. 
Finally,  a  resolution  of the· general  meeting  can  always  be  challenged  where 
the majority required unqer Article 36 or 39 was not obtained (Article 42 (f)).-
Article  43 
The .rules  which  lay  down  the  grounds  on  which resolutions  of the  general 
meeting may  be  void  or voidable  must .be  supplemented  by provisions  speci-
fying what persons are empowered to commence the proceedings in that behalf. 
Uniform rules  are not necessary  for  this  purpose:  equivalence  of shareholder 
protection can be achieved by minimum provisions. 
In respect· of defects in the rwtice of meeting which entail nullity or voidability, 
it must always  be possible for proceedings to be  commenced by shareholders 
who were not present or represented at the meeting (see  (a)). 
In  cases ·of  infringement  of  the  principle ·that  the  subject  matter  of  every 
resolution  must  have  featured  in  the  agenda,  not  only  absent  shareholders, 
but also shareholders among those present or represented who protested against 
such matters being discussed, ·may commence proceedings (see  (b)).  Where on 
the  other  hand  the  right  to  attend  a . meeting  has  been  refused,  only ·the . ', 
shareholder concerned  may  commence proceedings  (see  (c)).  The same  rule 
applies  in  the case  of a  refusal  to  produce· documents  or supply  information 
(see  (d)). 
A  distinction  must  be  drawn  in  cases ·of  infringements  against  provisiOns 
. concerning the right to vote which influence the result of the vote in question: 
where  the  shareholder was  prevented  from  voting,  then  he. at least  must  be 
able  to  have  recourse  to  the  court.  Where  the  shareholder,  on  the  other 
hand,  took  part  in  the  voting  irregularly,  every  other  shareholder  must  be 
able to  bring proceedings  (see  (e)).  Finally, where the necessary  majority for 
a  resolution  was  not  obtained,  all  the  shareholders  must  be  able  to  have 
recourse to the court. 
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Article  44 
The question  whether  a  resolution  of a  general  meeting  is  void  or voidable 
cannot remain too long in suspense.  Shareholders must, however, be protected 
against excessively short time limits  being fixed.  To reconcile these  opposing 
interests, the l)irective provides for a range of between three and twelve months 
within which the Member States may choose  <!_  period of limitation according 
to their requirements.  -
It is.  worth  noting  that.  the  period  can  only  run  from  the  time  when  the 
resolution  of the  general  meeting  became  adduceable  as  against  the  person 
claiming that the resolution is  void or voidable.  With regard to  all resolutions 
required to be  published under Directive No. 68/151/EEC, the commencement 
of i:he  period will be governed by Article 3(5)  of that Directive.  Furthermore, 
Article 18(1)  (c)  of the Proposal for a Third Directive contains simila~ provisions 
· in respect of the nullity of mergers. 
Member States  may  lay  down  different  periods  in  respect  of  grounds  for 
nullity or voidability other than· those laid down by Articles 42 and 43. 
\ 
Article  45. 
It  is  in the interests of shareholders tnat a resolution  ~hich is  attacked should 
be  replaced by  another resolution passed in  accordance with the law  ~nd the 
statutes,· rather than  d~clared void by judgment of the  court.  The Directive 
provides,  therefore,  that  the  competent  court  must  be  able· to  allow  the 
company. a period of time for this ,Ptirpose.  Similar provision is  made for cases 
of. winding  up  by  reason  of  the  number. of  members  havirig  been. reduced 
below  the  legal  minimum  (Article  5:---:-Proposal  a  Second  Directive)  and  of 
nullity of merger (Article  18(1)  (d)  Proposal for  a  Third Directive). 
Article  46 
The question under what circumstances a judgment declaring void a  r~solution 
of the general meeting  can  be  relied  on  as  against  third parties  can only be 
settled  by  applying  the  same  principles  as  apply  to  judgments on the nullity• 
of companies, which  are  contained in  Article  12 of Directive No 68/151/EEC 
·of~ March 1968.  Furthermore, similar rules are  l~id down with regard to the 
nullity of mergers by Article 18(1)  (e)  of the Proposal for a Third Directive. 
Article 47 
Member States  may  make  their own arrangements  with regard  to  voting by 
holders of c~rt~·tin classes of shares, either- by giving them separate votes within 
the general meeting or by  providing for  spe~ial meetings.  The latter must in 
all cases be governed by the sarpe rules as  apply to gerieral meetings iri  accord-
ance with the provisions of Chapter III of this Directive. 
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· The Adoption  and  Audit  of  the .Annual  Accounts 
Article  48 
With regard to  the  adoption  of the  annual  accounts,  the Directive  gives  the 
laws  of the Member States· the choice between giving either exclusive or sub-
sidiary competence to the general meeting.  Under the latter system, the manage-
men!  organ  and the supervisory  organ  adopt the  accounts  whilst the. general 
meeting does  no more than act as  an  arbitrator between them.  . The general 
meeting· only takes  i:he  final  decision_ if  so  requested  by  the two organs or if 
the latter fail  to  agr~e.  ·  ·  · 
Article .49 
Following the example of the laws  of five  of the Member States·,  the Directive 
provides  that a  legal  reserve shall  be  set  up.  Amounts  appropriated to this 
reserve must appear on the liabilities side of  the balance sheet (Article .8  of the 
Proposal for a Fourth Directive).  This is in acc;ord with the ·prohibition agains.t-
the distribution of profits to  shareholde~s where the net assets of the company 
. fall  below the  a~ount of the  ~apital subscribed plus non-distributable reserves 
(Article 12 of the Proposal for a  Second Directive). 
The objyct of the legal reserve is  to set aside part of the profits of the financial 
year exclusively for offsetting any future losses;  The legal reserve gives  a surer 
safeguard than the  capital subscribed,  which the company may dispose  of :by 
recourse to the procedure for  reduction  (see  Articles  27 to 34 of the Proposa1 
for a Second Directive).  · 
To  achi~ve equivalent protection for  members  and for third parties it is  suffi-
cient to  fix  the  minimum  amounts  that  are  to  be  appropriated  to  the  legal 
reserve.  These are to be at least 5% of the profits of the financial year up to 
a limit of 10%  of the capital subscribed (paragraph  1). · 
As  has  already  been  pointed  out, .these  ar~ only -minimum  provisions. ·  A 
Member State could, for example, set the limit referred to at 20% of the capital 
subscribed. 
The setting 4P  of a legal  reserve for  offsetting losses  would not suffice. on its . 
own.  It is  a  further  requirement  that there  be  no  other  available reserves. 
With regard to these available reserves there is  no need to distinguish between 
those created pursuant to a resolution of the general meeting and those created' 
·pursuant  to  a  provision  in  the  statutes.  In  fact  it  matters  little  that such 
reserves  may  previously  have  been  intended. for  other  purposes,  for  prioriry 
must  always  be  given  to  the  offsetting of losses. 
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However; the provisions referred to can only apply to the minimum, amounts 
which  must  be appropriated  to. the  legal  reserve  pursuant to  thi~ Directive. 
·Where the law or the statutes require larger amounts to be appropriated thereto 
they may be used for purposes other-than the offsetting of losses.  This corres-
ponds,  furthermore, with  Article  26  of  the  Proposal for  a  Second  Directive 
~hich provides  that  where  the;  capital  su.bscribed  is  increased  by  means ·of 
capitalization of reserves,  the legal  reserve may  be  used 'to  the extent that it 
exceeds 10% of the capital subscribed.  · 
Article  50. 
With regard to the adoption of  the annual accounts,. Article 48  gives  Member 
States  the  choice  between  giving  exclusive  or  subsidiary  competence  to  the 
general  meeting. 
The situation is  different,  however,  as  regards  the appropriation of the. result 
for  the  financial  year.  Five ·Member  States  give  competence  to  take·  this 
decis"ion to the general meeting, whilst the sixth gives by law to. the management 
organ  and the  supervisory  organ the  power  to  appropriate  one  half  of the 
profits  to free reserves  without the  consent  of the  shareholders.  These ·two 
systems cannot be  considered  as  equivalent  and  it  is,  ther"efore,  essential· to 
observe· throughout the Cqmmunity the  principle  that control over the  entire 
results of the financial  ye<!:r  should be in  the hands of the shareholders. 
This does  not mean, however, that profits should always  be  distributed.  On· 
the contrary, in many cases the necessity of ·setting up a  reserve is  indisputable~ 
It is  only a question of ensuring that the shareholders should have an influence 
·ov~r the decision.  · .  ..  1 
It is,  of course, useful  that the management should know· to what extent it is 
empowered to  set-up. reserves.  For this  purpose, paragraph 2  expressly pro-
vides that su~h a po:wer  may be delegated by  the statutes to the  man~gemertt 
organ.  However, it should not ·be possible by this means to reduce the powers 
·of the general meeting to nothing.  The Directive only authorizes appropriation 
to be required by the statutes within the limit of one half of "the  results of the. 
financial year ..  The general meeting. is  still competent to decide as to the appli-
cation  of the  remainder.  .  .  . 
ArticLe  s1 
.Under the laws of all the Member States,  the annual accounts of the company 
must be audited by persons other than those responsible for management of the. 
company.  ·Some Member States confine the powers of such persons .to auditing 
the annmil accounts, whilst others empower them also to supervise the manage-
ment of the company on a permanent basis,  It is  not necessary for the Direc-
tive to impose  ~he latter system on Member States.·  In any event the two-tier 
s.  10/72 syst~m provid~d for  by the Directive  entails  that  in every  company a  super-
visory  organ will  be  appointed  to  control  the  management  o~gan.  ·  There .  is 
no need, therefore, to entrust the same responsibilities to other persons as  well. 
However, the principle must be  observed throughout the Community that the 
·annual accounts must always be audited by persons other than the members of 
the supervisory organ.  It is  not necessary i:o  provide a uniform solution to the 
question  of  whether  such  persons  constitute  organs  of  the  company.  This 
applies also  as  to the number of persons who may or must be entrusted with 
the audit 9f the accounts. 
Article  52 
Only independent persons may be entrusted with the audit of the accounts of 
the  company.  Such  persons  must  also  have  the  necessary  qualifications. 
Detailed  provisions  on this  matter  cannot  be included  in  this  Directive,  as 
specific rules are in course of preparation. 
Article 53 
The requirement of independence entails that members of the management and 
supervisory organs must in all  cases be excluded from taking part in the audit 
of the accounts.- The same must apply with regard to the staff of the company, 
as they are under the orders of the management organ (paragraEh 1). 
The  laws  of  some  Member  States  consider  it  to  be  incompatible  with  the 
requirement  of  independence  that  persons  who  are  not on  the  staff  of the 
· company but render services to the company on a permanent and remunerated 
basis  should be  entrusted with  the audit  of the  accounts.  In  other Member 
States, on the other hand, it is  permissible, and common P.ractice, for the posi-
tion  of auditor of  the ·company's accounts  to  be  combined with  that  of  an 
adviser  to  the  company.·  This  legal  disparity  is  left  untouched  by  the 
Directive. 
As  this  Article  is  only a  m1mmum  prov1s10n,  the  Member States  are  free  to · 
disqualify as  auditors the spouses,  relations in  the direct line or the collateral 
. relations  of persons  prohibited  by  the Directive  from  auditing  the  accounts. 
Furthermore,  the  Member  States  may  also · exclude  persons  who  are  not 
employed in  the  company to  be  audited  but  are  employed  in  an  associated 
company.  In this respect, Community rules can only be introduced as  part of 
the coordination of the laws  relating to groups of companies. 
The prohibition contained in the Directive  against entrusting the·  audit of the 
accounts to members of the management or supervisory organs or of the staff 
of the company would be quite insufficient if it were only applicable in  resp~ct 
of  the  position  occupied  as  at  the  time  of  being  apP.ointed  auditor.  ,The 
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independence of the person concerned would be equally questionable if he  had 
occupied such a position a short time previously.  In  such a case-he might, as. 
a  member of one of the  two  organs  or as  an  employee,  have  taken  part in 
transactions having a· direct bearing on the annual accounts to be  audited.  In-
the interests of certaintyin the law, a certain period should be laid down.  This . 
should be  three  ye~rs, as  provided in  various  Member States  (paragraph 1). • 
It  is for the Member States to settle the conditions under which accounts may 
be· audited  by . .firms  or· companies  instead  of  natural  p~rsons.  It  must  be 
appreciated that ~.hen a firm  or company is  entrusted with these functions its 
independence  may· in  certain  particular  circumstances  be open  to  question. 
This would be  the case where the relationship between members, the manage-
ment or the autorized representatives of the auditing firm  or company and the 
company .  to  be  audited  are  su~h that  these  per~ons could· not  be  app~inted 
auditors as individuals.  This prohibition-must apply also  to the auditing firm 
·or company (paragraph 2).'  ·  · 
·Article 54 
. The  object  of  thi~ article  is  to . safeguaCd  the  independence  of  auditors by 
prohibiting  them  frpm  being engaged  or  employed  by' the  audited  company 
during a period of three years followi.ng  the end of the·  audit.  This provision 
is  based to a large extent on Article 53. 
Article  55 
In  principl~ the persons who are. to audit the  accounts  are  appointed by  the 
general meeting.  However, the laws of the Member States may make excep-
tions  in  cases  where the compariy  is· in  the  course  of formation, for  example 
by providing for appointment by the' statutes, or by  the instrument of consti-
tution or any other document (paragraph 1).  '  ' 
What happens if the general. meeting does  not make such appointment in due 
time?  The matter cannot wait until another general meeting is  convened, _nor 
can the  appointment be  entrusted to the management or .supervisory  organs  .. 
· In  this  case  it is  for the court to ·make the appointment.  Application  can be 
made to the court either by a shareholder or by the management or supervisory 
organs.  The same rule applies where persons appointed by the general meeting 
are unable to carry out their functions  (paragraph 2) .. 
C~ses might  arise  where  the general  meeting  makes an appointment without 
taking  into  account  at  the  time  all  the  circumstances  which  might  call  in 
question the independence of the persons appointed.  Every appointment must, 
therefore, be subject to revocation by the court where there are proper grounds. 
It would not be justifiable, however, for one shareholder alone to be empowered 
s.  10/72  '  65 to commence proceedings in this behalf.  For this reason, this can only be done 
by a minority of shareholders (paragraph 3).  This minority is -the sa'!le as  that 
which can require that proceedings be  commenced on behalf of the  company 
against members of the !Jlanagement or supervisory organs  (Article 16)  or that 
a general meeting be  convened  (Article 23)  or that one· or more new.  items  be 
added to the agenda (Article  25).  Save  for  a time limit of two weeks for the 
making of the application, the rules governing such proceedings are to be laid 
down by the Member States. 
Article  56 
Certain Member States limit the duration of the appointment of auditors to 'one 
year, whilst in others appointments are always made for several years.  Appoint-
ments inay be ·renewed under all the legar  systems .. There is  a difference from 
the point of view  of the auditor,  however,  between  holding  an  office  which 
expires  after one  audit  of  the  annual  accounts,  and  remaining  in  office  for 
several years unless removed oh proper grounck  The latter solution gives him 
greater independence and the Directive therefore lays  down that appointments 
shall be for a minimum duration of three years  . 
. It  is not without danger, however," to leave the auditing of a company's accounts 
in the same hands for an unlimited period.  Therefore a maximum duration of 
six years is laid down for each appointment.  The general meeting must, there-
fore, at the expiry of each· period of office make a new appointment.  It is .not 
possible to prolong a period of office from year to year by tacit renewal unless 
the general meeting ,decides  otherwise. 
Article 57 
The remuneration of the persons appointed to audit the -accounts must be fixed, 
for the whole of  their period of office,  before such period commences  (para-
graph 1).  This does not mean that the total amount must be exactly fixed  in 
advance;  reference  may  be  made  to  a  scale.  Neither  the  company  nor  the 
auditor, however, must be in a  position to influence the amount of the remu-
ner:\tion.  To avoid circumvention of this principle, no other remuneration or 
benefit may be granted to the auditors.  It is  permissible, on .the other hand, to 
grant them special remuneration for services  other than their auditing services 
(paragraph  2).  ·  · 
Article 58 
The audit of the accounts must cover  also  the books of the company, as  well 
as  .the  annual  accounts . and  the· annual  report  within  the  meaning  of ·the 
Proposal for a Fourth Dir~ctive. 
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The documents in que§tion must first be examined as  to their conformity with 
the law.  In so  far as  the law ·allows, the provisions of the statutes must also 
be observed (paragraph 1.):.  · 
The resul~s of  the auditrriust qe recorded on the  ·a~nual accounts  (p~ragraph 2). 
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'Article  59 
To carry  out their functions_·the  auditors  must have  a  ~ide right to obtain 
information  and  make  investigations.- However,  the  question  whether  such 
right should apply also in respect of undertakings associated with the company· 
to be  audited can only be  dealt with_ as  part of the coordination of the  laws 
relating to groups- of companies.  ' 
Article  60 
The  results  of  the  audit  of  the  accounts  are  to be  recorded  on  the  annual 
accounts.  Such  record  is  confined  to  a  s·ta~ement either that ·the  company's 
books, the annual accounts and the annual report are  in  conformity wi'th  the 
law  and -the  statutes, or in  what respects  they  are. not. · This will  no suffice, 
however;  for  the  information  of  the  sh~reholders, and  they  must  therefore 
recei~e an auditors' report in 'accordance with this Article,  to· be  publi~hed as 
provided for'in Article 44  of the Proposal for  a Fourth Directive.  -
Article  61 
In some Member States the law provides that auditors· may' be removed at any 
'time before the end of their period of office, whilst in others this may only be 
done where proper grounds exist.  In fact the importance of this divergence is 
diminished  by  the fact -that dismissal without proper grounds  generally  gives 
rise to a right to compensation.  But auditors must be protected against arbi-
trary removal, 'not so much in their own interests as in those of the shareholders 
_and  creditors of the company.  The Directive therefore only permits dismissal 
on proper grounds. 
/ 
Article 62 
The responsibility of persons responsible for auditing the accounts must be as 
strict  as  that  of  members  of  the  management  or supervisory  organs ·of  the 
company.  National  provisio'ns  which  limit  their  liability,  in  the  event  of 
negligence,  to a certain figure are incompatible with this  principle. 
s.  10/72  67 Article  63 
Serious  infringements  of  the  provisions  relating  to  the  auditing  of  accounts 
must result in the nullity or voidability of the resolutions adopting the annual 
accounts.  Special  provision  must be  made  for  thjs  case,  in  additi~n to the 
general  rules  of  Article  42  on nullity  and  voidability  of  resolutions  of  the 
general meeting.  The list of conditions is limitative in the sense that resolutions 
cannot  be rendered  void  or voidable  by  infringements  of  any  other  of  the 
provisions  of this  Directive relating to auditing.  Where Member States  have 
prescribed this  sanction  for  infringements  not included  in the  list,  such  rules 
m~y remaip.  in  force. 
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